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Abstract 
This dissertation presents the development of a new approach to include the interaction of 
vertically differentiated products, a subject that has been largely ignored in previous studies, to 
analyze the market power of exporters and importers in the world markets of agricultural 
commodities.  Three theoretical models, a residual demand elasticity (RDE) model, a residual 
supply elasticity (RSE) model, and a two-country partial equilibrium trade model, are developed, 
and the corresponding empirical models are specified for U.S.-Japan soybean trade.  Genetically 
modified (GM) and non-genetically modified (non-GM) soybeans are vertically differentiated 
products in the sense that GM soybeans are largely defined as an inferior substitute to non-GM 
soybeans.  I compare two versions of these models: a new approach in which the interaction 
between non-GM and GM soybeans is taken into account and the traditional approach in which 
the interaction is ignored.  
In each of the three models (the RDE model, the RSE model, and the partial equilibrium 
trade model), the traditional approach overestimates the market margin of U.S. non-GM soybean 
exporters and that of Japanese non-GM soybean importers.  By considering the interaction 
between non-GM and GM soybeans, the new approach greatly reduces the estimates of the 
corresponding market margins of U.S. exporters and Japanese importers to improve the accuracy 
of such estimates.  The statistical significance of the coefficient estimate of the interaction term, 
the U.S. GM soybean price or the Japanese GM soybean price, in all three models suggests that 
the new approach, which includes the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans, is 
necessary and preferred.  
The partial equilibrium trade model includes both an RDE equation and an RSE equation 
in a system to address the possible contemporaneous cross-equation correlation.  Thus, the 
  
estimation results of the partial equilibrium trade model are further improved, compared to those 
of the RDE model and the RSE model.  Using the traditional approach to estimate the partial 
equilibrium trade model, I find that the U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market margin is 56.5% 
and the Japanese non-GM soybean importers’ market margin is 16.1%.  However, the results 
obtained by using the new approach show that the market margins of U.S. exporters and 
Japanese importers are 33.2% and 6%, respectively.  By taking into account the interaction 
between non-GM and GM soybeans, the new approach improves the accuracy of the estimates of 
market margins of soybean exporters and importers.  U.S. non-GM soybean exporters do have a 
significant market margin in international markets, but it is not as large as the one suggested by 
the traditional approach.  Although Japanese non-GM soybean importers enjoy some market 
margin, it is relatively small.  
The theoretical and empirical models and results in this dissertation provide new and 
more accurate estimates of residual demand and supply elasticities and market power and 
improve the understanding on world soybean markets.  These results can be useful for industry 
participants in international soybean markets, academic researchers, and policy makers.  
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 1.1 Problem Identification 
World agricultural commodity trade flows have changed dramatically during the last 
decade.  On the production side, major agricultural commodity producing countries such as the 
United States (U.S.), Brazil, and China started and expanded the production of genetically 
modified (GM) crops.  On the consumption side, world demand for agricultural commodities has 
been increasing significantly, mostly due to higher incomes in developing countries and world 
population growth.  The production and trade of GM crops may help meet the increasing world 
demand, but some consumers are concerned about the potential risks associated with GM crops.  
A number of countries have imposed various restrictions on the imports of GM products.  The 
European Union (EU) is one of the world’s largest agricultural commodity importers, but it 
places very tight regulations on the imports of GM agricultural commodities.  EU consumers are 
very sensitive about the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agricultural and food 
products.  For instance, “the average premium for non-genetically modified (non-GM) soybeans 
and meal is a tolerance of 1% presence of GM material in 2002-03” (Brookes 2004, p.4). 
Another major importing country with strict policies for GMOs is Japan.  Japan has very strict 
labeling rules and a tolerance of a maximum 5% presence of GM material for soybeans imports.  
Japan also limits the use of GMOs for direct human consumption, except for vegetable oils. 
Market power may exist in the world markets of agricultural commodities due to high 
market concentration, barriers to entry, product differentiation, or state trading behaviors.  The 
existence and degree of the market power have important implications for world agricultural 
producers, consumers, and governments.  Numerous studies have examined and measured the 
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degree of market power in the markets of commodities and other agricultural/food products1. 
However, the interaction between two vertically differentiated goods − traditional non-GM 
commodities and GM commodities − was not taken into account in previous studies.  For any 
type of agricultural commodity, the non-GM commodity and the GM commodity are vertically 
differentiated in the sense that, if the prices of the two goods are the same, all consumers will 
generally prefer the non-GM commodity.  The demand for one good depends on not only its own 
price, but also the price of the other vertically differentiated good.  If a trader or an agricultural 
producer supplies both the non-GM and the GM commodity, he or she will set the pricing 
strategies for the two commodities jointly rather than independently.  Failing to include the 
interaction between the two vertically differentiated goods can result in incorrect measures of 
exporters’ or importers’ market power in world commodity markets and misleading policy and 
welfare implications. 
 1.2 Objectives   
This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature by explicitly including the interaction 
between non-GM soybeans and GM soybeans in an analysis of the market power of exporters 
and importers in world soybean markets.  I first develop a conceptual model that extends the 
Goldberg and Knetter (1999) approach to incorporate the interaction between non-GM and GM 
soybeans in the world demand and supply functions of the two goods.  Then, I conduct an 
empirical estimation on U.S.-Japan soybean trade based on the conceptual model. 
                                                 
1 Carter et al. (1999), Yang and Lee (2001), Cho et al. (2002), Saghaian and Reed (2004), Poosiripinyo and Reed 
(2005), Song et al. (2006), Andersen et al. (2008), Felt et al. (2010), Mulik and Crespi (2011), and Yamaura (2011) 
measure the degree of market power in the trade of agricultural and food products. 
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The U.S. residual demand function and Japan’s residual supply function are specified and 
estimated to obtain the corresponding residual demand and supply elasticities for non-GM 
soybeans.  The estimation results are then used to calculate the market power of U.S. exporters 
or Japanese importers in international soybean markets.  For purposes of comparison, the same 
data set will be used to conduct a second estimation based on a traditional model that does not 
include the interaction of non-GM and GM soybeans.  The results from the two models are 
compared to determine how a lack of consideration for the interaction between two vertically 
differentiated products (non-GM and GM soybeans) affects the elasticity estimates and the 
measures of market power in world soybean markets. 
 1.3 Organization of Chapters 
The remaining chapters are organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides background 
information on product differentiation and the structure of non-GM and GM crop industry.  
Chapter 3 outlines studies of imperfect competition in international markets.  The methodology 
and data are described in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively.  Chapter 6 discusses the results of the 
empirical analysis.  Finally, conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 2 - PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND THE 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
This chapter provides background information on product differentiation and the industry 
structure of non-GM and GM crops.  The first part of the section defines product differentiation, 
and the second part of the section provides an overview of the relevant literature in empirical 
studies of vertically differentiated products.  The third part of the section provides overviews of 
producing and consuming countries’ attitudes toward biotechnology.  Lastly, an overview of 
studies for non-GM and GM crops is provided. 
 2.1 Definition 
There are three types of product differentiation: 1) vertical differentiation, 2) horizontal 
differentiation, and 3) mixed differentiation.  Vertical differentiation “occurs in a market where 
the several goods that are present can be ordered according to their objective quality from the 
highest to the lowest.  It’s possible to say in this case that one good is ‘better’ than another” 
(Piana 2003, p.3).  Horizontal product differentiation is defined as products that differ by 
features which cannot be ordered in an objective way.  Features for horizontally differentiated 
products are often based on colors, styles, or tastes (Piana 2003).  Hotteling-type location2 
models illustrate the idea of horizontal differentiation. 
 Mixed differentiation is characterized by both vertical and horizontal differentiation.  
Thus, products of mixed differentiation have different quality levels as with vertical 
differentiation and also have different characteristics such as shapes, taste, style, or color, as with 
                                                 
2 Hotteling (1929) developed a location model that demonstrates the relationship between location and firm’s pricing 
behavior. 
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horizontal differentiation.  In this case, consumers consider both quality levels and characteristics 
of goods when making their purchasing decision. 
For sources of product differentiation, Tirole (1988, p.306) indicated that “incumbents 
may have patented product innovations, or they may have cornered the right niches in the 
product space, or they may enjoy consumer loyalty.”  Carlton and Perloff (2005) listed two 
approaches that are frequently used for the estimation on markets of differentiated products: a 
demand system and a choice experience model.  The first approach involves estimating a system 
of demand functions with possible restrictions on model parameters.  In a choice experience 
model, each product’s market share is specified as a function of product characteristics and 
prices.  The estimation is conducted using a traditional logit or the more general random 
parameter logit model (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
 2.2 Empirical Studies on Agricultural Commodities 
Lavoie (2005) developed theoretical and empirical models to examine price 
discrimination in the wheat industry based on the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model.  In the study, 
wheat is a vertically differentiated intermediate good, and international wheat trade is 
characterized by the presence of state-trading enterprises.  Lavoie (2005) showed that price 
differences are not fully explained by elements under perfect competition in any two markets.  
Those elements are a difference in grade or protein content, a difference in handling and shipping 
cost in each Canadian port or a difference in scarcity rent.  Lavoie concluded that “the Canadian 
Wheat Board pricing strategy is more complex and dynamic than the prescription for static 
optimization derived in this study” (Lavoie 2005, p.851). 
A study by Eales and Binkley (2003) examined consumer demand in a baking mix 
market, which bears a strong resemblance to a theoretical model of a vertically differentiated 
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product using a linear approximate almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS).  There is no price 
competition in the theoretical model of vertical differentiation.  The authors discovered that there 
is price competition in an empirical analysis, but it is not strong.  They pointed out that two 
major baking mix firms have used different marketing strategies to occupy widely different 
points on the quality scale.  This behavior has led to market equilibria with very little price 
competition.  They concluded that the empirical evidence of the baking mix market validates the 
conclusions of the theoretical models. 
 2.3 History of Non-GM and GM Products  
Since 6 countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Mexico, and the U.S.) first 
planted biotech crops in 1996, the number of such biotech-crop-producing countries has 
increased to 29 in 2011.  Figure 2.1 shows the global area of biotech crops from 1996 to 2011. 
The global area of biotech crops has been increasing since 1996, and it reached 160 million 
hectares (Mha) in 2011.  Table 2.1 shows a planted area of biotech crops in 2011 by country.  
The top 10 countries with more than one million hectares in 2011 are the U.S. (69 Mha), Brazil 
(30.3 Mha), Argentina (23.7 Mha), India (10.6 Mha), Canada (10.4 Mha), China (3.9 Mha), 
Paraguay (2.8 Mha), Pakistan (2.6 Mha), South Africa (2.3 Mha), and Uruguay (1.3 Mha) (James 
2011).  However, the planted areas in the other 19 countries3 in 2011 were smaller than before 
(James 2011). 
James (2009) summarized the shares of biotech-herbicide-tolerant crops in 2009.  GM 
soybeans were the most planted biotech crop in the world and accounted for approximately 52% 
                                                 
3 The 19 countries that plant GM crops are Bolivia, Australia, Philippines, Burkina Faso, Myanmar, Spain, Mexico, 
Colombia, Chile, Honduras, Portugal, Czech Republic, Poland, Egypt, Slovakia, Costa Rica, Romania, Sweden, and 
Germany. 
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of the global biotech crop area.  GM maize was the second most planted crop, with 31% of the 
global biotech crop area, followed by GM cotton (12%) and GM canola (5%). 
Figure 2.2 shows the GM soybean cultivation area by acreage globally and for the top 
three producing countries.  In 1997, around five million hectares of globally planted soybeans 
were categorized as GM soybeans.  Over a five-year period, GM soybean technology was 
quickly adopted by many soybean farms, and by 2003, more than 40 Mha was designated for 
GM soybeans.  By 2009, the acreage of GM soybeans was close to 70 Mha.  The U.S. is the 
largest GM soybean-producing country, and about 30 Mha of GM soybeans were produced in 
the U.S. in 2009.  Argentina is the second largest GM soybean-producing country, with about 20 
Mha planted in 2009.  Since 2005, Brazil has been the third largest GM soybean-producing 
country and planted approximately 15 Mha in 2009.  Therefore, approximately 60% of the global 
GM soybeans were produced in the U.S., Argentina, and Brazil in 2009. 
 2.3.1 Attitudes toward Biotechnology − The Production Side 
In this section, I discuss the biotech policies and the history of major GMO-producing 
countries.  The U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and China are the top four GMO-producing countries.  
Song (2006) summarized the biotech policies of top GMO-producing countries in 2004 to 
analyze soybean markets.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture − Economics Research Service 
(USDA-ERS) is a good information source of biotech policies. 
 U.S. 
Since it adopted GMO technology in 1996, the U.S. has led world agricultural 
biotechnology in product, adoption, commercialization, and exports (Song 2006).  In 2011, U.S. 
biotech varieties included soybean, maize, cotton, canola, sugar beet, alfalfa, papaya, and squash 
(Table 2.1).  The USDA-ERS reported that U.S. farmers expected lower production costs, 
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expected higher yields, reduced herbicide use from planting GM crops, and adopted biotech 
commodities immediately after they were available in 1996 (USDA-ERS 2004).  As the U.S. 
GM commodities expanded, so did the variety of U.S. biotech agricultural products and 
genetically engineered (GE) traits for herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect resistance (Bt).  Some 
examples of U.S. biotech commodities shares are 93% of HT soybeans, 78% of HT cotton, 73% 
of Bt cotton, 70% of HT corn, and 63% of Bt corn (USDA-ERS 2011).  In 2010, the U.S. was 
the largest producer of biotech crops, and it accounted for over 48% of world production (James 
2010).  China, Japan, and Mexico were major importing countries of U.S. soybeans. 
 Brazil 
Although the Brazilian government did not allow the adoption and commercialization of 
biotech commodities before 2003, biotech commodities, mainly soybeans, were illegally planted 
on a large scale.  In 2003, the government officially approved the planting of GM soybeans in 
Brazil (James 2005).  Bt cotton was first planted in 2006, and biotech maize was planted in 2007.  
In 2011, Brazilian biotech varieties included soybean, maize, and cotton (Table 2.1).  Brazil was 
the second largest soybean producing country in 2011.  The major destination for soybean grain 
was China, Europe for soybean meal, and Iran and India for soybean oil and vegetable oil (James 
2009).  James (2010) reported that Brazil has retained the second largest grower position of GM 
crops in the world and had the largest absolute increase in production from 2009 to 2010.  Brazil 
plants approximately 17% of all the GM crops in the world (James 2010). 
 Argentina 
Argentina had one of the earliest biotech soybean field trials in 1986.  Argentina has 
grown GM soybeans and has had the highest GM soybean adoption rate since 1996.  Bt cotton 
and maize were first planted in 1998.  Almost all (99%) of the soybeans planted in 2005 were 
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GM varieties (James 2005), and an estimated 83% of the maize and 95% of the cotton planted 
were GM varieties in 2009.  Argentina is a major competitor in the international soybean market 
(Figure 2.2).  In 2011, Argentinean biotech varieties included soybean, maize, and cotton (Table 
2.1).  In 2010, Argentina had 22.9 Mha of biotech crops and 19.5 Mha were planted for GM 
soybeans and 3 Mha were planted for GM maize.  Argentina had the highest GM crop adoptions 
in 2010.  GM soybean adoption rate is 100%, and the rate of GM maize is 86%.  
 China 
In China, Bt cotton was the dominant GM commodity in 1997, and no other food GM 
commodities were approved for production before 2001 (Marchant et al. 2002).  The national 
adoption rate for Bt cotton was 68% in 2009.  In addition to cotton, the other biotech varieties 
produced in China are papaya, poplar, tomato, and sweet pepper (Table 2.1).  In 2009, China 
approved biotech rice and maize.  This approval in China is “the most important biotech 
development” (James 2010, p.96) for China, Asia, and the world, because “rice is the most 
important food crop and maize is the most important feed crop in the world” (James 2010, p.96).  
 Canada 
Canada is one of six biotech crop founding countries.  GM canola was first planted in 
1996, and the national adoption rate for GM canola was 94% in 2010 (James 2010).  Only 1% of 
planted canola in 2010 was conventional canola, and the remaining (5%) was planted to become 
mutation-derived GM canola.  Since 2008, Canada has planted GM sugarbeets.  Ninety-five 
percent of the total plantings of sugar beets were biotech sugarbeets in 2010 (James 2010).  Two 
other major biotech crops, soybeans and maize, represented over 60% of total plantings in 2006.  
Canadian biotech varieties include canola, sugarbeets, maize, and soybeans (Table 2.1).  Canada 
retained its position as the fifth largest biotech crop-planting country in the world in 2010.  
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 India 
In India, Bt cotton was the first planted a GM commodity in 2002.  James (2010) reported 
that India had been the second largest cotton-producing country since 2006, and adoption of Bt 
cotton resulted in a representation of 86% of the total cotton planted in India in 2010.  The 
acreage of Bt cotton has increased by 188 times in 9 years so that “Bt cotton had transformed 
cotton production in India by increasing yield, decreasing insecticide applications, and, through 
welfare benefits, contributed to the alleviation of poverty for more than 6 million small resource-
poor farmers in 2010” (James 2010, p. 45).  Indian biotech varieties were cotton and rice in 2011 
(Table 2.1).   
 2.3.2 Attitudes toward Biotechnology − The Consumer Side 
The U.S., the leading biotech producing country, does not require any mandatory labeling 
for its biotech food products.  However, the top three soybean importing countries, China, EU, 
and Japan, require that all food products containing biotech contents must be labeled (Marchant 
et al. 2002). 
 China 
When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese 
government implemented several regulations for biotech crops such as biosafety administration, 
biosafety evaluation, import safety, and labeling administration for agricultural biotech products.  
The specific rules on importing biotech products based on the regulations include the following: 
1) Test results from in-country field experiments in the exporting country are required for 
imported biotech products for human consumption, 2) Identity Preserved (IP) handling 
certificates are required for imported biotech commodities, and 3) all biotech products must be 
labeled. 
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The approval of biosafety for biotech rice and maize in 2009 would greatly affect the 
interests of not only global agriculture-producing countries but also Chinese consumers.  The 
potential benefits of these crops for China are also enormous (James 2009).      
 EU 
The EU has strict labeling rules for biotech products.  However, some countries in the EU 
have planted GM crops.  In 2011, eight EU countries planted biotech crops.  Six EU countries − 
Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania − planted Bt maize, and three 
EU countries − Czech Republic, Sweden, and Germany − planted GM potatoes.  However, no 
country planted GM soybeans.  
 On the import side, EU regulations on GM food and feed4 provide a general framework 
for GMO regulations.  The EU initially imported only soybeans with a zero tolerance for traces 
of biotech varieties.  After encountering many difficulties, EU now accepts soybean imports with 
up to 0.9% of approved GM material (Aramyan et al. 2009).  This regulation provides rules for 
the labeling of GM products and “a threshold for the presence of GM material that is 
adventitious or technically unavoidable” (European Commission5).  Austria, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Germany, and Luxembourg are currently applying safeguard clauses on GMO events 
(European Commission). 
 Japan 
Seven biotech crops (alfalfa, corn, cotton, potato, rapeseed, soybean, and sugarbeets) and 
six food additives (α-amylase, chymosin, glucoamylase, lipase, pullulanase, and riboflavin) are 
                                                 
4 The Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed. 
5 For more detailed information on GMO policy in EU, see Food and Feed Safety, European Commission. 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/evaluation/gmo_nutshell_en.htm.  
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permissible for food consumption in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2011).  The 
main characteristic of these GM crops is resistance to herbicides, and these GM food additives 
are used to produce processed foods.  Since 2001, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) has required labeling of GM crops and products, including seven crops and 32 
groups of processed food products in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2011). 
Yamaura (2011) summarized the Japanese soybean consumption and non-GM soybean 
trade.  In the 1990s, GM soybean consumption became a widely debated topic in Japan.  Then 
Japanese consumers drove the debate by purchasing more non-GMO products (Yamaura 2011).  
These Japanese consumer behaviors were influenced by the Japanese food culture, in which 
soybeans are a staple in many Japanese foods and dishes.  Tofu and natto, ethnic Japanese foods 
of fermented whole soybeans, are examples of typical soybean foods.  In 2000, all manufacturers 
of soy products completed the shift to using only non-GM soybeans for tofu and natto production 
in Japan.  Japan imports soybeans using two major shipping methods: bulk shipments and 
container shipments.  Container shipments have become more popular in 2010 for shipping 
specialty soybeans6 from the U.S. to Japan and are particularly useful in shipping IP-handled 
soybeans.  These containers enable Japanese importers to keep their shipments of GM soybeans 
for oils and livestock feeds separated from non-GM soybeans for human consumption (Yamaura 
2011). 
Non-GM and GM are vertically differentiated products.  If the prices of both type of 
product are the same, worldwide consumers prefer non-GM soybeans to GM soybeans because 
of quality concerns.  However, due to the lower prices of GM soybeans, most countries7 choose 
                                                 
6 Specialty soybeans are all non-GM soybeans. 
7 These countries include China, the largest soybean importing country, and Mexico, the fourth largest soybean 
importing country. 
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to import and consume GM soybeans.  This is not the case for either EU or Japan.  Given the 
current price difference between non-GM and GM soybeans, EU and Japanese consumers 
strongly prefer non-GM soybeans and are willing to pay premium prices for these commodities 
(James 2010).  
 2.4 GM Soybean Share in Producing Countries 
Figure 2.3 shows GM soybean shares of total soybean acreage of the world and three 
countries.  In 1996, the world GM soybean share was less than 20%; since then, however, there 
has been rapid adoption of GM soybeans around the world.  The world GM soybean share 
reached 50%, 60%, and 70% in 1998, 2001, and 2008, respectively.  In 2009, the world GM 
soybean share was close to 80% of total soybean production.  Only three years after the 
introduction of GM soybeans in the U.S., the GM soybean share in the total U.S. soybean 
production was over 50%.  Argentina is one of the countries with the largest and most rapid GM 
soybean adoption rate.  In 1997, more than 40% of Argentina’s total soybeans were GM 
soybeans.  At present, Argentina soybeans are almost all GM soybeans.  Brazil started the 
commercial production of GM soybeans in 2003.  GM soybeans represented more than 70% of 
all soybeans in 2008. 
 Table 2.2 shows GM soybean acreages and GM soybean ratios of many countries and the 
world.  In the world, the acreage of GM soybeans accounted for only 7.6% of total soybean 
acreage in 1997.  After 12 years, the world GM soybean percentage became 77%.  In the U.S., 
the GM soybean ratio increased from 4% in 1997 to 91% in 2009.  A similar increase in the 
share of GM soybean acreage occurred in many other countries.   
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 2.5 Studies for GM and Non-GM Crops 
Researchers have focused on the welfare effects of GM product labeling.  Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004) investigated the effect of a ban on GM products in markets with heterogeneous 
producers and consumers.  Giannakas and Yiannaka (2006) extended the analysis to include 
organic, GMO, and conventional food products to analyze the effects of the labeling of organic 
products on consumer welfare.  Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) found GM labeling regimes in 
countries depended on five issues: the distribution of consumer preferences, the size of the 
segregation and labeling costs, the relative productive efficiency, the market power of 
companies, and the strength of intellectual property rights.  Giannakas and Yiannaka (2008) 
analyzed the case of consumer-oriented GM products as second-generation GM products to 
determine the corresponding welfare effects on consumers.  Lassoued and Giannakas (2010) 
examined the implications of a mandatory labeling regime.   
Moschini et al. (2000) developed a world trade model with three regions, the U.S., South 
America, and the rest of the world, to evaluate the welfare effects of the adoption of GMO, 
especially Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans, in the soybean complex using calibration techniques 
with assumed parameter values of soybean trade, such as supply and demand elasticities and RR 
seed price mark-up.  They focused on a GM soybean innovator-monopolist case with a large 
number of competitors, both in the home country and importing countries.  Sobolevsky et al. 
(2005) extended the Moschini et al. (2000) study by separating two South American countries: 
Argentina, which is an early adopter and had the world’s highest adoption rates of RR soybeans 
in 2003, and Brazil, which has not permanently authorized the use of GM soybeans8.   
                                                 
8 Brazil did not permit production of GMO at the time of the Sobolevsky et al. (2005) study.  
15 
 
Lapan and Moschini (2001, 2004) built a two-country partial equilibrium model (the U.S. 
as the home country and Europe as the importer) to analyze the implications of the introduction 
of GM products.  The U.S. has a monopolist seed supplier, and U.S. consumers are indifferent 
toward the difference between non-GM and GM products, while EU consumers treat GM 
products as inferior substitutes for non-GM products.   
Saunders and Cagatay (2003) simulated various scenarios for the impact of GM food 
production on producers, consumers, and trade in New Zealand.  They used the Lincoln trade 
and environment model to quantify both global and regional effects on farmers who adopt GM 
biotech and consumers who change their preferences related to GM products.  Saunders and 
Cagatay (2003) summarized eight studies that focus on trade impacts of GM products and use 
partial equilibrium or general equilibrium models with calibration problems9.  Saunders and 
Cagatay (2003) found that the estimation results of various scenarios are consistent with these 
findings, such as a rise in GM-free imports into Japan or EU and a fall of GM imports from the 
U.S. They concluded that the results that markets in Japan and EU have such an influence on 
world and New Zealand trade are not surprising.  The results also indicated that Japanese and EU 
consumers are very sensitive to GM products and prefer to consume GM-free products. 
Konduru et al. (2009) focused on the separation of non-GM and GM products.  IP 
systems are used to separate non-GM and GM crops through relevant supply chains and export 
markets.  Analysis of GMO testing is widely used for IP systems analysis.  GMO testing is used 
in the field to detect the presence or confirm the absence of certain GM crops (Konduru et al. 
2009).  The authors examined the implications of measurement uncertainty in GMO testing on 
                                                 
9 Saunders and Cagatay (2003) argued that calibration problems arise as one of the main issues at this level of 
disaggregation in the general equilibrium analysis. 
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the behavior of importers and exporters.  They concluded that the direct impacts on the behavior 
of importers and exporters come from 1) relative size of IP costs and testing and rejection costs, 
2) premium prices offered in the non-GM markets, and 3) measurement uncertainty. 
Gryson et al. (2008) examined the segregation costs and benefits for non-GM and GM 
compound feed production in Belgian livestock products.  The authors focused on the IP 
production costs of non-GM products and examined three different cost scenarios.  They found 
that the extra costs for non-GM production are substantial.  Gryson et al. (2008) concluded that 
consumers will choose the cheapest products if confronted with a price difference for non-GM 
and GM products. 
Choi (2010) theoretically investigated the competition in markets of GM and GMO-free 
products to analyze the current GM restriction policies in Europe.  Focusing on import quota and 
a ban on GM products, Choi considered two scenarios: Cournot-Nash equilibrium and 
Stackelberg equilibrium under free trade between the U.S. and Europe.  According to Choi 
(2010), consumers cannot recognize GM products by visual inspection, and non-GM can only be 
distinguished from GM products by DNA analysis.  Therefore, Choi (2010) treated these two 
products as perfect substitutes in the absence of labels, but close substitutes with labels.  Choi’s 
research showed that the GMO-free product price will be increased, and consumer welfare will 
be reduced by import quotas on GM products.  In the long run, only landowners in countries 
importing GM products will benefit from import bans on GM products, and there are no benefits 
for producers of traditional non-GM products.  
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Table 2.1: Harvested Biotech Crops in 2011 by Country 
           Biotech Crops             
Rank Country Area Maize Soybean Cotton Canola Sugar beet Alfalfa Papaya Squash Poplar Tomato 
Sweet 
Pepper Potato 
1 U.S. 69.0 X X X X X X X X     2 Brazil 30.3 X X X          3 Argentina 23.7 X X X          4 India 10.6   X          5 Canada 10.4 X X  X X        6 China 3.9   X    X  X X X  7 Paraguay 2.8  X           8 Pakistan 2.6   X          9 South Africa 2.3 X X X          10 Uruguay 1.3 X X           11 Bolivia 0.9  X           12 Australia 0.7   X X         13 Philippines 0.6 X            14 Myanmar 0.3   X          15 Burkina Faso 0.3   X          16 Mexico 0.2  X X          17 Spain 0.1 X            
18 Colombia <0.1   X          19 Chile <0.1 X X  X         20 Honduras <0.1 X            21 Portugal <0.1 X            22 Czech Republic <0.1 X           X 23 Poland <0.1 X            24 Egypt <0.1 X            25 Slovakia <0.1 X            26 Romania <0.1 X            27 Sweden <0.1            X 28 Costa Rica <0.1  X X          
29 Germany <0.1                       X 
Harvested area is million hectares.            Top 17 countries with harvested biotech crops more than or equal to 50,000 hectares.       Source: Modified James (2011) Table 1.             
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Table 2.2: GM Soybean Acreage and Ratio by Country 
  
Cultivation Area in Million Hectares GM Ratio 
  Year Total Soybean GM Soybean % 
World 1997 67 5.1 7.6 
2009 90 69 77 
U.S. 1997 25.7 3.6 4 
2009 31 28.6 91 
Argentina 1997 6.2 1.4 22.6 
2009 17.5 17.4 99 
Brazil 1999 13 1.4* 10 
2009 23 16.2 71 
Canada 1997 0.9 0.0001 0.01 
2007 1.1 0.7 62.5 
Mexico 2000 0.12 0.0005 0.4 
2006 0.1 0.005 4.5 
Paraguay 2004 2 1.2 60 
2009 2.6 2.2 85 
Romania 1999 0.097 0.016 16 
2006 0.14 0.1 70 
South Africa 2001 - 0.008 - 
2009 0.24 0.2 85 
Uruguay 2002 - 0.02 - 
2007 0.47 0.47 100 
Bolivia 2009 0.9 0.8 89 
* 1999-2002 illegal cultivation of GM soybeans, data estimated  
Source: Modified GMO Compass http://www.gmo-compass.org/  
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Figure 2.1: Global Area of Biotech Crops from 1996 to 2011 
 
Source: Modified James (2011) Figure 1. 
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Figure 2.2: Global GM Soybean Cultivation Acreage in Million Hectares 
 
Source: James (1996-2010) 
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Figure 2.3: GM Soybean Share in the Total Soybean Acreage for Each Country 
 
Source: James (1996-2010) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Global U.S. Argentina Brazil
22 
 
Chapter 3 - IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL 
MARKETS 
The first part of the chapter provides an overview of the relationship between price 
transmission and exchange rates in international trade.  Then exporters’ and importers’ market 
power and the associated economic models are discussed.  Finally, a partial equilibrium trade 
model is examined. 
 3.1 Price Transmission and Exchange Rate 
Paudel et al. (2004) argued that the market mechanism and structure of international 
markets were affected by price transmission and exchange rate elasticities.  Therefore, the 
authors suggested that it is important to define the relationship between international prices and 
domestic prices to analyze traders’ responses to international price changes.  Previous studies 
presented conflicting views on the magnitude of price transmission and the elasticity of exchange 
rates.  Johnson (1977) assumed that there is perfect price transmission, and Bredahl et al. (1979) 
assumed that the price transmission elasticity for the rest of world is zero as a restricted trade 
minimum for the elasticity of export demand and is one as internal prices are not insulated by 
government policies (Bredahl et al. 1979).  Pick and Carter (1994) showed an imperfect 
transmission process; i.e., the pass-through rate is less than one.  Paudel et al. (2004) examined a 
consistent model using the stepwise selection criteria and concluded that “international price 
transmission elasticities and exchange rate elasticities for soybeans are less than one in both the 
short run and the long run” (Paudel et al. 2004, p.11) for U.S. soybeans sold in Japan.  The 
authors found that the effect of transportation cost was not significant, and as a result, the 
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omission of transportation cost did not significantly influence the estimated price transmission 
elasticities and exchange rate elasticities. 
 3.2 Exporters’ Market Power-Export Supply Function 
Kang et al. (2009a) examined market power using a two-stage least squares regression 
(2SLS) for the world rice market.  They also evaluated the effect of a four-firm concentration 
ratio (CR4) on rice exporters’ market power.  Estimation results indicated that the major rice-
exporting countries had market power in international rice markets.  Interestingly, the elasticity 
of rice export price with respect to CR4 was statistically insignificant; this implied that the 
market power of rice exporting countries was not significantly increasing in the market 
concentration.  
 A study conducted by Kang and Kennedy (2009) examined the effect of market power on 
coffee prices.  They extended Bahmani-Oskooee and Ltaifa’s (1992) research on the effect of the 
real exchange rate on export volume.  Export supply functions were estimated using the 
instrumental variable (IV) and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methods.  They concluded 
that IV and SUR yield similar results, and coffee exporting countries have some market power in 
international coffee markets.  
 3.2.1 Pricing-To-Market Model  
Krugman (1986) originally developed the concept of the pricing-to-market (PTM) models 
to address the relationship between exchange rates and import prices.  He defined the PTM 
model as “import prices fall ‘too little’ when a currency appreciates” (Krugman 1986, p. 3).  
After examining static and dynamic models with demand and supply functions for monopolistic 
price discrimination and oligopolistic cases, Krugman (1986) concluded the following: 
24 
 
 “[E]xplaining PTM model is not as simple as one might hope.  It seems clear that a 
perfectly competitive model will not do the trick… the best hope of understanding pricing to 
market therefore seems to come from dynamic models of imperfect competition…” (Krugman 
1986, p.32). 
Although Krugman did not provide more detailed explanations for the PTM model, he did bring 
the PTM model to the attention of other researchers.  
Knetter (1989) contributed to the development of a specific functional PTM model 
associated with exchange rate fluctuation.  Knetter built a PTM model based on exporters’ profit 
maximization as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝐸 = 𝜃𝐸 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑖𝐸 + 𝑢𝑖𝐸,                                                       
where 𝑃𝑖𝐸 is the export price to destination market i at period t, 𝑠𝑖𝐸 is the exchange rate in terms 
of the number of a destination market currency per unit of exporter currency, 𝜃𝐸 R is the time 
effect, 𝜆𝑖 is the country effect, 𝛽𝑖 is the elasticity of the export price with respect to the exchange 
rate, and 𝑢𝑖𝐸 is the disturbance.  Knetter’s PTM model can distinguish among three different 
market conditions: a competitive market, an imperfectly competitive market, and an integrated 
market.  The estimated coefficients of 𝜆𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are used for the market conditions.  In a 
competitive market, price equals marginal cost, and the Lerner index is zero.  This means that the 
time effect measures the common price, no variation in the data is related to the country effect or 
the exchange rate, and the estimates of 𝜆𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are zero.  If the market is imperfectly 
competitive, then price does not equal marginal cost, the Lerner Index is positive, and the 
estimates of 𝜆𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are not zero.  The author stated that “U.S. export prices are rather 
insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations….  German export prices appear to be much more 
sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations” (Knetter 1989, p.209). 
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 3.2.2 Residual Demand Elasticity Model  
Baker and Bresnahan (1988) originally developed the residual demand elasticity (RDE) 
model to measure the market power of a single firm in an imperfectly competitive market.  In a 
perfectly competitive market, if a firm reduces its production, other firms would increase their 
production to offset the shortage by the first firm’s contraction.  Therefore, a single firm’s 
residual demand is infinitely elastic.  The residual demand curve of a single firm is downward 
sloping when the market is imperfectly competitive or has product differentiation.  Baker and 
Bresnahan specified the inverse demand function for a single firm (firm 1) as: 
𝑃1 = 𝑀�𝑄1,𝒀,𝑾,𝑾𝟏;  𝛼𝑖 ,𝛽𝑖,𝜃𝑖�,                                                     
where 𝑀(·) is the inverse residual demand function for firm 1, 𝒀 is a vector of exogenous 
demand shifters, 𝑾 is the industry-wide factor prices, 𝑾𝟏 is firm 1’s firm-specific factor prices, 
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are parameters, and 𝜃𝑖 is a vector of indexes of the oligopoly solution component for 
all firms.  The quantities of other firms’ products are represented by                   𝑄𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖�𝑄1,𝒀,𝑾,𝑾𝟏;  𝛼𝑖,𝛽𝑖,𝜃𝑖�. 
Goldberg and Knetter (1999) measured the market power of German beer exporters and 
U.S. linerboard exporters in specific destination markets based on the model of Baker and 
Bresnahan (1988).  They estimated residual demand elasticities to derive measurements of the 
market power of German beer exporters and U.S. linerboard exporters in each destination 
country without firm-specific data.  They used the exchange rate as an ideal cost shifter to 
investigate the market power of exporters in a specific foreign market without detailed cost 
shifters of their competitors.  Based on a theoretical model for the general case of exporter i in a 
single destination, Goldberg and Knetter obtained an export price function as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅,𝑒𝑒(𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑾𝑵,𝒁,𝜃𝑁),                                                        
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where 𝑃𝑒𝑒 is the export price, 𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅,𝑒𝑒(. ) is the inverse residual demand curve, 𝑄𝑒𝑒 P is the quantity 
of exported good, 𝑾𝑵 is a vector of all firm-specific cost shifters excluding the exporter group of 
interest, 𝒁 is the vector of demand shifters in the destination market, and 𝜃𝑁 P is the union of all 
the conduct parameters (Goldberg and Knetter, 1999).  Goldberg and Knetter estimated the 
market margins of German beer exporters in various destination markets and found that “the 
higher (in absolute value) the elasticity is, the weaker the competition German exporters face” 
(Goldberg and Knetter 1999, p.51).  The authors concluded that “the extent of exchange rate 
variation provides a strong natural experiment for the purpose of identifying the residual demand 
elasticity in each destination” (Goldberg and Knetter 1999, p.58).   
Poosiripinyo and Reed (2005) discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a RDE 
model.  The advantages of an RDE model are thus: 1) it can measure market power with modest 
data requirements, 2) it can directly estimate the elasticities using a double-log form, and 3) it 
incorporates an exchange rate variable in the model as an indicator of marginal cost change.  On 
the other hand, it is difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients without the parameter of the 
residual demand elasticity.   
Carter et al. (1999) assumed that each country is a single firm, and the model parameters 
could be interpreted as the share-weighted industry averages for all firms within one country.  
Carter et al. analyzed the world wheat market by using an RDE model.  Using the double-log 
form of inverse residual demand function, Carter et al. estimated the price flexibility for the U.S. 
wheat exports to Japan directly.  They applied likelihood ratio tests for model selection.  There 
are three alternative market structure models: the competitive model, the monopsony model, and 
the U.S. price leadership model.  Carter et al. (1999) found that the Japanese wheat import 
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market was imperfectly competitive and show that U.S. exporters had a 93% market margin in 
Japan. 
Yang and Lee (2001) compared two methods, using an RDE model as in Goldberg and 
Knetter (1999) to estimate price flexibilities and using a system of multinomial logit (ML) model 
as in Nevo (1996), to measure the price-cost markup in a study on exporters’ market power in 
South Korean wheat and corn import markets.  The results indicated that exporters had market 
power in the wheat import market.  The market margins of U.S., Canadian, and Australian 
exporters were 38.4%, 14.6%, and 14.2%, respectively.  However, there is no market power in 
the corn import market.  The two approaches (the RDE model and the ML model) yielded 
similar results in each market.   
Glauben and Loy (2003) compared the RDE model with another approach, the PTM 
model by Krugman (1987), in estimating the market power of German food and beverage 
exporters in international markets.  They concluded that the two approaches produced 
inconsistent results: the PTM model indicates that the German food and beverage exporters have 
market power, while the RDE model does not.  Glauben and Loy (2003) argued that this conflict 
is probably due to fixed contracts, which are often used in the food and beverage export market.  
Another study by Zhang et al. (2007) compared the PTM model and the RDE model by 
examining the U.S. and Brazilian soybean exporters’ market power in 10 destination markets.   
Cho et al. (2002) extended the RDE model by using a real exchange rate, which is 
obtained by deflating a nominal exchange rate using the inflation rates of exporting and 
importing countries.  Goldberg and Knetter (1999) used a nominal exchange rate as a cost 
shifter.  However, Cho et al. argued against the use of nominal exchange rates by stating that the 
“monetary authority of each country determines money supply independently, and a country 
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could experience a higher inflation rate than the other, which causes appreciation of the values of 
exchange rates” (Cho et al. 2002, p.2).  Cho et al. used the real exchange rate and found that U.S. 
wheat exporters had large market margins in some Asian countries: 61.4% in South Korea and 
83.8% in the Philippines. 
Felt et al. (2010) used an RDE model to evaluate the effects of the Taiwanese pork 
import ban on exporters’ market power in Japanese pork imports.  The authors developed a 
duopoly case based on Goldberg and Knetter’s (1999) model.  Using the generalized method of 
moments, Felt et al. confirmed that Canadian, Danish, and U.S. exporters had market power in 
the Japanese pork import market.  In particular, it is found that U.S. pork exporters had more 
market power than exporters in other exporting countries.  
A study by Saghaian and Reed (2004) measured the market power beef exporters in the 
Japanese import markets using an RDE model.  Based on the model of Goldberg and Knetter 
(1999), Saghaian and Reed added a time trend to their model and examined four equations, 
representing the four main beef exporters to Japan.  Although U.S. exporters in the frozen-ribs 
category receive the highest market margin, Australian and New Zealand exporters also have 
some market power in five of the six chilled-beef categories. 
Mulik and Crespi (2011) further extended the RDE model in examining the effects of 
the entry of GM rice for Indian and Pakistan rice exporters.  They captured the impact of the 
entry of GM rice by including a dummy variable for entry and its interaction term.  The market 
margins of Indian exporters in U.K. and Kuwait were 27.3% and 13.8%, respectively, before the 
entry of GM rice.  However, the market margins dropped to 19.1% and 5.6% in the U.K. and 
Kuwait, respectively, after the entry of GM rice. 
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Conjectural Variations 
The RDE models in Goldberg and Knetter (1999) and many other studies use conjectural 
variations.  A conjectural variations approach incorporates a firm’s belief about how rivals will 
react to its output choice within a static framework.  Mathematically, “for all firm i we are 
concerned with the assumed value of the derivative 
𝜕𝑞𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖
 for all firms j other than firm i itself” 
(Nicholson 2005, p.419).  There has been some criticism against the use of conjectural 
variations.  Carlton and Perloff (2005, p.159) summarized the two main criticisms.  First, the 
conjectures that firms hold are arbitrary.  To address the conjectures’ arbitrariness, Stigler (1964) 
developed a cartel theory analysis of oligopoly behavior.  Many other models have been 
developed based on game theory.  Second, multi-period interpretations of conjectural variations 
models are implausible.  Dynamic conjectural variations models are based on inconsistent firm 
beliefs and actions.  However, the models based on game theory are also subject to criticism.  
One statement against those models is that they also use many arbitrary assumptions (e.g., firms 
have particular beliefs about other firms’ behavior, firms choose output levels rather than prices, 
or they choose prices rather than output levels, etc.).  In the existing literature, models based on 
game theory are used in some studies, while models using conjectural variations are used in other 
studies.  In spite of these criticisms, many empirical works used a conjectural variations model 
for assessing market power, since a conjectural variations model has strong advantages such as 
the ability to measure market power with modest data requirements.  Especially focusing on 
measuring market power in international agricultural trade, a conjectural variations approach is 
widely used in empirical studies such as using a RDE model in Goldberg and Knetter (1999), 
Carter et al. (1999), and Mulik and Crespi (2011).   
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3.3 Importer’s Market Power-Import Demand Function 
Few studies have examined importers’ market power in international markets of 
agricultural commodities.  This is probably due to the fact that producers or exporters are usually 
perceived to have some market power, and there are difficulties in gathering importers’ data.  
Kang et al. (2009c) examined the price and income elasticity in the world rice market using the 
double log form of an import demand function.  The results indicated that there were inelastic 
price and income elasticities in the world rice market.   
Based on the RDE model in Goldberg and Knetter (1999), the residual supply elasticity 
(RSE) model can be applied to estimate the market margins of importers in international 
markets.  Song (2006) developed an import price function to analyze the inverse of residual 
supply elasticity in the Chinese soybean import market.   
 3.4 Partial Equilibrium Trade Model 
The residual demand elasticity model and the residual supply elasticity model can be 
used together to construct a partial equilibrium trade model.  Andersen et al. (2008) examined 
oligopoly and oligopsony market power in the European dried salted cod market.  The authors 
modeled the interaction between sellers and buyers with potential market power by using the 
RDE and RSE models.  They developed an RSE model based on the work of Durham and Sexton 
(1992).  As Andersen et al. discussed, there has been greater attention paid to the potential for 
buyers in international markets to exercise market power, and both sellers and buyers can 
exercise market power in the supply chains along which large producing and wholesaling firms 
sell products to large retailers (Andersen et al. 2008).  Their three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regression results showed that Norwegian exporters had a 17.3% market margin and Portuguese 
importers also enjoyed a 10.5% market margin.  Therefore, the authors found that both sellers 
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and buyers enjoy some market power in international markets of dried salted cod.  The authors 
concluded that the “oligopolist’s negative influence on quantity traded will be reinforced if the 
oligopsonist reduces the market price of the good by reducing the quantity it purchases” 
(Andersen et al. 2008, p.19) in markets in which both sellers and buyers have market power.   
Song (2006) examined the Chinese soybean import market using a two-country partial 
equilibrium trade model.  The partial equilibrium trade model was developed based on the RDE 
model, a special inverse residual supply model, equilibrium condition as the quantity of imports 
is equal to the quantity of exports, and price relationship.  Song compared who has more market 
power − U.S. exporters or Chinese importers − in the Chinese soybean import market.  This 
approach measures the market margins of both soybean importers and exporters in the Chinese 
soybean import market and has more restrictive conditions compared to the usual RDE model 
because it includes an equilibrium condition.  The author examined only U.S exporters in the 
Chinese soybean import market and found that “the market power of Chinese soybean importers 
is stronger than that of U.S. soybean exporters” (Song 2006, p.91).  Because of data limitations, 
Song (2006) did not include the imports from South American countries, which account for 
approximately 40% of total Chinese soybean imports.  This limitation indicates that readers need 
to be cautious in interpreting the empirical results of the study.  
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Chapter 4 - METHODOLOGY 
 4.1 Theoretical Model 
I adopt and extend Goldberg and Knetter’s approach to examine market power in 
international agricultural commodity markets.  I use three models in the analysis.  First, I apply 
Goldberg and Knetter’s residual demand model to study international markets of non-GM and 
GM soybeans.  Second, I develop a residual supply model based on Goldberg and Knetter’s 
inverse residual demand function and Song’s inverse residual supply function.  Third, I build a 
two-country partial equilibrium trade model using inverse residual demand and inverse residual 
supply functions.  For each of the three models, I specify and estimate two versions of the model: 
one version with the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans and another version without 
the interaction.  
 4.1.1 Residual Demand Curve 
The demand curve that a firm faces is called a residual demand curve.  This curve 
represents the market demand that is not met by other firms at any given price.  The left panel of 
Figure 4.1 depicts the market demand for non-GM soybeans in importing country 2’s market, 
and the supply curve of other suppliers, 𝑆𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑒𝐸, represents the sum of domestic supply, imports 
from other exporting countries, and the net change of stocks of non-GM soybeans in importing 
country 2.  In the right panel, the residual demand curve faced by exporting country 1, 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑅,1, is 
derived as the difference between the market demand for non-GM soybeans in importing country 
2 and the supply curve of other suppliers.  A marginal revenue curve is drawn based on the 
residual demand curve.  The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the marginal 
revenue curve and the marginal cost curve.  
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 4.1.2 Residual Demand Elasticity Model 
Goldberg and Knetter (1999) built a general residual demand function of a homogeneous 
product in a particular market structure with a dominant firm and a competitive fringe.  They 
focused on multiple exporters in a single destination market.  The demand functions faced by a 
specific exporting country (ex) and its competitors in other countries are: 
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝑒𝑒(𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑃1, … ,𝑃𝑛,𝒁),                                                       
𝑃𝑘 = 𝐷𝑘�𝑄𝑘,𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝒁�      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘,          
where 𝑃𝑒𝑒 is the price of the export good in units of the destination market currency and 𝑄𝑒𝑒 is 
the total quantity of exports from the source country to the destination market.  𝑃1, … ,𝑃𝑛 are the 
prices of n competing homogeneous products produced in other countries, and 𝒁 is a vector of 
destination market demand shifters.  𝑃𝑘 is the price of exporters from the competing country k (k 
=1, 2, …, n) in units of the destination market currency.  𝑄𝑘 is the total quantity of exports from 
competitors from country k to the destination market.  Solving the first-order conditions of the 
profit maximization problems, they obtained the export price function: 
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅,𝑒𝑒(𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑾𝑁 ,𝒁,𝜃𝑁),                                                        
where 𝑾𝑁 denote the union of all firm-specific cost shifters, excluding the exporter group of 
interest, and 𝜃𝑁is the union of all the conduct parameters (Goldberg and Knetter, 1999). 
 4.1.3 Residual Demand Elasticity Model with Vertically Differentiated Products 
Next, I lay out the theoretical model for exporters with vertical differential products in a 
single destination.  The inverse residual demand functions are specified as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝑒𝑒(𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑃1, … ,𝑃𝑛,𝑃𝐺 ,𝒁),                                               (1) 
𝑃𝑘 = 𝐷𝑘�𝑄𝑘,𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝐺 ,𝒁�    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘,           
𝑃𝐺 = 𝐷𝐺�𝑄𝐺 ,𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝒁�,    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛,                                     
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where 𝑃𝐺  is the price of GM commodity, which is the vertically differentiated variety compared 
to non-GM commodity in units of the destination market currency, and 𝑄𝐺 is the corresponding 
total quantity of exports from the source country to the destination market.  For this specific 
exporting country, the profit maximization problem for one exporter, exporter i, can be written 
as: max
𝑞𝑖
𝑒𝑥
𝜋𝑖
𝑒𝑒 = 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑒 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑒𝑒(𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑒),                                                              
where 𝑒𝑒𝑒 is the exchange rate between the destination market and the exporting country and 
𝑀𝑖
𝑒𝑒 is the total cost function of exporter i.  Strategic interactions among firms are assumed to be 
represented by 𝜕𝑞𝑚
𝑒𝑥
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑒𝑥 ≠ 0 with 𝑚 ≠ 𝑖 (conjectural variations).  Based on the first-order condition, 
the following is obtained:  
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑒𝑒 − 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐷1𝑒𝑒𝜃𝑖(𝜑 + 𝜉),                                                       
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑒𝑒 is the marginal cost for exporter i, 𝜃𝑖 = �1 + ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑚𝑒𝑥𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑖≠𝑖 � captures the competitive 
behavior among exporters within the source country, 𝜑 = �1 + ∑ 𝜕𝐷𝑒𝑥
𝜕𝑃𝑘𝑘
𝜕𝐷𝑘
𝜕𝑃𝑒𝑥
� captures the 
competitive interaction between source country firms and foreign producers, 𝜉 = 𝜕𝐷𝑒𝑥
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝐷𝐺
𝜕𝑃𝑒𝑥
  
captures the interaction term of non-GM and GM commodities from the source country, and 𝐷1 
denotes the partial derivative of a demand function with respect to its first argument. 
Following Goldberg and Knetter (1999), this study applies parameters that are 
interpreted as industry averages that are share-weighted means for all firms in the source country 
rather than using implausible aggregation assumptions such as symmetry of firms (Goldberg and 
Knetter, 1999).   
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Therefore, multiplying the first-order condition for exporter i with its market share, 𝑠𝑖, 
and summing the products yield: 
�𝑠𝑖𝑃
𝑒𝑒 =
𝑖
�𝑠𝑖𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑒𝑒 −
𝑖
�𝑠𝑖𝑞𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝐷1
𝑒𝑒𝜃𝑖(𝜑 + 𝜉)
𝑖
. 
The result is a transformed version of the first-order condition for profit maximization that can 
be estimated using market-level data (Goldberg and Knetter, 1999) as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒 − 𝑄𝑒𝑒𝐷1𝑒𝑒𝜃(𝜑 + 𝜉), 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , and 𝜃 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖2𝜃𝑖𝑖 . 
Similarly, for n competing exporting countries, the first-order conditions are used to 
obtain 
𝑃𝑘 = 𝑒𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑘(𝑄𝑘,𝑾𝑘) − 𝑄𝑘𝐷1𝑘�𝑄𝑘,𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝐺 ,𝒁�𝜃𝑘 , 
where 𝑄𝑘 is the quantity of the export good, 𝑾𝑘 is a vector of cost shifters, 𝜃𝑘 is the union of all 
of the conduct parameters of country k, and k = 1, 2, …, n.  Let 𝑾𝑁 denote the union of all firm-
specific cost shifters.  Therefore, an export price function for exporters of country k is: 
𝑃𝑘 = 𝑃𝑘′(𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑾𝑁 ,𝒁,𝜃𝑘).                                                           (2) 
For the vertically differentiated variety, GM commodity, I use the first-order conditions 
to obtain thus:  
𝑃𝐺 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝐺(𝑄𝐺 ,𝑾𝐺) − 𝑄𝐺𝐷1𝐺�𝑄𝐺 ,𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝒁�𝜇𝐺 , 
where 𝑄𝐺 is the quantity, 𝑾𝐺  is a vector of cost shifters, and 𝜇𝐺 is the union of all the conduct 
parameters of GM commodity.  Therefore, an export price function for the vertically 
differentiated variety, GM commodity, is: 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝑃𝐺′(𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑾𝐺 ,𝒁, 𝜇𝐺).                                                       (3) 
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 4.1.4 Calculation of Exporters’ Market Power 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1) and assuming that the marginal cost of firms 
is conditioned by the level of output and a vector of input prices denoted 𝑾, the following export 
price function is obtained:           𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝑒𝑒�𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑃1∗ , … ,𝑃𝑛∗ ,𝑃𝐺∗ ,𝒁� 
   → 𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑒 (𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑾𝑁 ,𝑾𝐺 ,𝒁,𝜃𝑁 ,𝜇𝐺;  𝜑, 𝜉),                                                 
where 𝜃𝑁 is the union of all of the within-country conduct parameters of all exporting countries. 
Exporters’ market power is calculated by finding the inverse of the residual demand 
elasticity.  It is straightforward to show that the Lerner index for exporters of a source country, 
which measures the market power, is equal to the negative inverse of the residual demand 
elasticity: 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑒𝑒 = 𝑃 −𝑀𝑀
𝑃
= 𝑃 −𝑀𝑀
𝑃
= 𝑃 − 𝜕𝑇𝑀 𝜕𝑄⁄
𝑃
 
                     = 𝑃 − �𝑃 + 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )�
𝑃
=  −1(𝜕𝑄 𝜕𝑃⁄ )(𝑃 𝑄⁄ )  
 =  − 1
𝜀𝑑
 ,                                                
  
where 𝜀𝑑 is the residual demand elasticity.   
Following Goldberg and Knetter (1999), I find that the residual demand elasticity is: 
𝜀𝑑  = 1𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑒 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒⁄  .                                                                              
Thus, exporters’ market power in the destination market, which is measured by the Lerner Index, 
is                   
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𝐿𝐼𝑒𝑒 = −𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑒 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒⁄ . 
 4.1.5 Residual Supply Curve 
The supply curve that a single buyer faces is called a residual supply curve.  This curve 
represents the market supply that is not purchased by other buyers at any given price.  The right 
panel of Figure 4.2 depicts the market supply for non-GM soybeans of exporting country 1, and 
the demand curve for other buyers, 𝐷𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑒𝐸, represents the sum of domestic demand, exports to 
other importing countries, and the net change of stocks of non-GM soybeans of exporting 
country 1.  The residual supply curve faced by exporting country 1 in the market of importing 
country 2, 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑅,2, the corresponding marginal expenditure curve, and the equilibrium are 
presented in the left panel. 
 4.1.6 Residual Supply Elasticity Model  
Based on Goldberg and Knetter (1999) and Song (2006), I develop the theoretical model 
for multiple importers that import from a specific exporting country.  The inverse supply faced 
by a specific importing country (im) and its competitors in other countries are specified as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑃1,𝐸𝑖, … ,𝑃𝐿,𝐸𝑖,𝑯�,                                                                  
𝑃𝑙,𝐸𝑖 = 𝑆𝑙,𝐸𝑖�𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖 ,𝑃ℎ,𝐸𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑯�       𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ = 1, … , 𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ ≠ 𝑙,               
where 𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑄𝑖𝑖 are the price and quantity of the imported good in the specific importing 
country, 𝑃1,𝐸𝑖, …, and 𝑃𝐿,𝐸𝑖 are the prices of the imported good in L other importing countries, 
𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖 is the total quantity of imports by competitors in importing country l (l = 1, 2, …, L) from 
the exporting country, and 𝑯 is a vector of supply shifters of the exporters.  The profit 
maximization problem for an importer j in the specific importing country can be written as: 
max
𝑞𝑗
𝑖𝑚
𝜋𝑗
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑗𝑖𝑖,                                                                           
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where 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑖, 𝑇𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑖 , and 𝑞𝑗𝑖𝑖 are the profit, total value function, and quantity of the importer j, 
respectively.  Rearranging the first-order condition yields: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑆1𝑖𝑖𝜃𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜑𝑖𝑖,                                                              
where 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the marginal value for importer j, 𝜃𝑗𝑖𝑖 = �1 + ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑚𝜕𝑞𝑗𝑖𝑚𝑖≠𝑗 � is the sum of the 
competitive behavior among importers within the specific importing country, and 𝜑𝑖𝑖 =
�1 + ∑ 𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑚
𝜕𝑃𝑙,𝑜𝑖 𝜕𝑆𝑙,𝑜𝑖𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑙 � is the sum of the conjectural variation parameter that is the competitive 
interaction between the importers of the specific importing country and importers in other 
importing countries.  Similar to an RDE model, the parameters are industry averages that are 
share-weighted means for all firms in the specific importing country rather than using 
implausible aggregation assumptions.  Therefore, multiplying the first-order condition for 
importer j with its market share, 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑖, and summing the products yield: 
�𝑠𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑖 =
𝑗
�𝑠𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑗
𝑖𝑖 −
𝑗
�𝑠𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑆1
𝑖𝑖𝜃𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝜑𝑖𝑖
𝑗
. 
Then I get a transformed version of the first-order condition for profit maximization for the 
market level data of the specific importing country: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑆1𝑖𝑖𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜑𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗 , and 𝜃𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗2𝜃𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗 . 
 4.1.7 Residual Supply Elasticity Model with Vertically Differentiated Products 
Next, I extend the theoretical model of residual supply to include the interaction among 
vertically differential products; i.e., the non-GM product and the GM product.  The supply 
functions of the non-GM product for the specific importing country and the other importing 
country and the supply function of the GM product for the importing country are: 
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𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑃1,𝐸𝑖 , … ,𝑃𝐿,𝐸𝑖 ,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺 ,𝑯�,                                                           (4) 
𝑃𝑙,𝐸𝑖 = 𝑆𝑙,𝐸𝑖�𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖 ,𝑃ℎ,𝐸𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺 ,𝑯�       𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ = 1, … , 𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ ≠ 𝑙,               
𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝐺 ,𝑃ℎ,𝐸𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑯�,    𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ = 1, … , 𝐿.            
Then, I derive and rearrange the first-order conditions to obtain the following condition for the 
specific importing country: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑆1𝑖𝑖𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑖�,                     
where 𝜉𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑚
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑚,𝐺 𝜕𝑆𝐺𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑚 captures the interaction between two vertically differentiated products 
in the importing country.   
 For the competing importers in other importing countries, rearranging the first-order 
conditions yields 
𝑃𝑙,𝐸𝑖 = 𝑒𝑙,𝐸𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑙,𝐸𝑖�𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖 ,𝑹𝑙� − 𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖𝑆1𝑙,𝐸𝑖�𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖 ,𝑃ℎ,𝐸𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺 ,𝑯�𝜃𝑙,𝐸𝑖 , 
where 𝑄𝑙,𝐸𝑖 is the quantity of import good, 𝑹𝑙 is a vector of country l’s cost shifters, 𝜃𝑙,𝐸𝑖 is the 
union of all of the conduct parameters of country l, and l = 1, 2, …, L.  Let 𝑹𝐿 denote the union 
of all firm-specific cost shifters.  Thus, an import price function for importers of country l is: 
𝑃𝑙,𝐸𝑖 = 𝑃𝑙,𝐸𝑖′�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑹𝐿 ,𝑯,𝜃𝑙,𝐸𝑖�.                                                           (5) 
For the vertically differentiated variety, the GM commodity, I also use the first-order 
conditions to obtain  
𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺 = 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐺�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝐺 ,𝑹𝐺� − 𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝑆1𝐺�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝐺 ,𝑃ℎ,𝐸𝑖,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑯�𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝐺 , 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝐺 is the quantity, 𝑹𝐺 is a vector of cost shifters, and 𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝐺 is the union of all of the 
conduct parameters of the GM commodity.  Then, the export price function for the vertically 
differentiated variety, the GM commodity, is: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺 = 𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺′�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑹𝐺 ,𝑯, 𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝐺�.                                                        (6) 
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 4.1.8 Calculation of Importers’ Market Power 
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into (4) and assuming that the marginal cost of firms 
is conditioned by the level of output and a vector of input prices, I can express the import price 
of the specific importing country as a function of the import quantity and all exogenous 
variables:           𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖�𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑃1,𝐸𝑖∗ , … ,𝑃𝐿,𝐸𝑖∗ ,𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝐺∗ ,𝑯� 
    → 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑖𝑖 �𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑹𝐿 ,𝑹𝐺 ,𝑯,𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝐿 ,𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝐺;  𝜑𝑖𝑖, 𝜉𝑖𝑖�,                              
where 𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝐿 is the union of all the within-country conduct parameters of all importing countries. 
I can use the residual supply elasticity to calculate importers’ market power.  It is 
straightforward to show that the Lerner index for importers of a destination country, which 
measures their market power, is equal to the inverse of the residual supply elasticity: 
𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀 − 𝑃
𝑃
= 𝜕𝑇𝑀 𝜕𝑄⁄ − 𝑃
𝑃
= �𝑃 + 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )� − 𝑃
𝑃
  
    = 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )
𝑃
                                                                     
=  1
𝜀𝑅
 ,                                                                               
where 𝜀𝑅 is the residual supply elasticity.  For comparison to the Lerner index for exporters of a 
source country, the adjusted Lerner index for importers of a destination country is needed: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀 − 𝑃
𝑀𝑀
= 𝜕𝑇𝑀 𝜕𝑄⁄ − 𝑃
𝜕𝑇𝑀 𝜕𝑄⁄
= �𝑃 + 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )� − 𝑃
𝑃 + 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )   
    = 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )
𝑃 + 𝑄(𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑄⁄ )                                         
=  11 + 𝜀𝑅 .                                                   
Then, I find the residual supply elasticity is: 
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𝜀𝑅  = 1𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖⁄  .                                                                                    
Thus, importers’ market power in the destination market, which is measured by the adjusted 
Lerner Index, is:  
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑖  = 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖⁄1 + 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖⁄  .                                                                            
 4.1.9 Inflation Rate and Nominal Exchange Rate  
Many previous studies use nominal exchange rates by assuming that there are no 
substantial differences of inflation rates among exporters and importers.  Cho et al. (2002) 
indicated that using only nominal exchange rates to adjust prices and costs across countries to 
make them comparable may not be adequate so that both nominal exchange rates and inflation 
rates are needed in the adjustments and comparison.  In this dissertation, I first deflate the 
nominal exchange rates by using the inflation rates, and then I use the deflated exchange rates to 
make all prices and cost shifters comparable across countries.   
 4.1.10 Partial Equilibrium Trade Model 
In addition to a single residual demand model for the specific exporting country and a 
single residual supply model for the specific importing country, I examine a two-country partial 
equilibrium trade model, which includes both the residual demand function and the residual 
supply function in order to take possible contemporaneous cross-equation correlations into 
account.  
I specify the two-country partial equilibrium trade model as      
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 �
𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝐷𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑒 (𝑄𝑒𝑒,𝑾𝑁 ,𝑾𝐺 ,𝒁,𝜃𝑁 , 𝜇𝐺;  𝜑, 𝜉)                                  
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝐸𝑒𝑅𝑖𝑖 �𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑹𝐿 ,𝑹𝐺 ,𝑯,𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝐿 ,𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝐺;  𝜑𝑖𝑖, 𝜉𝑖𝑖�,                  
where 𝑄𝑒𝑒 = 𝑄𝑖𝑖 to recognize that the quantity imported by an importing country from an 
exporting country is equal to the corresponding quantity exported by the exporting country to the 
importing country.  The first equation is the residual demand function of the specific exporting 
country (ex), and the second equation is the residual supply function of the specific importing 
country (im).  
 4.2 Empirical Models 
Based on the three theoretical models above, I develop corresponding empirical models 
in this section.  I apply the empirical models to U.S.-Japan soybean trade, which is an important 
part of international soybean markets.  Given that over 70% of Japanese soybean imports are 
from the U.S., the empirical results should also be useful for the corresponding industries and 
policy makers in the two countries.  Carter et al. (1999) assumed that each country is a single 
firm and that the model parameters could be interpreted as the share-weighted industry averages 
for all firms within one country.  For both the U.S. and Japan, where there is more than one firm 
exporting to Japan and importing from the U.S., I interpret “the parameters as share-weighted 
industry averages for all firms” (Carter et al. 1999 p.5) in the U.S. and in Japan, respectively.  I 
follow Carter et al. (1999) and treat each exporting and importing country as a single firm; i.e., 
the U.S. is a single exporter and Japan is a single importer of soybeans in the empirical models.  
Therefore, this study is able “to transform the first-order conditions as estimated with market 
level data without using implausible aggregation assumption” (Carter et al. 1999 p.5). 
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 4.2.1 Empirical RDE Model 
Following Goldberg and Knetter (1999), I use a logarithm functional form in the 
empirical specification so that it is straightforward to express elasticities in simple forms of 
model parameters.  Two versions of the residual demand elasticity (RDE) model for the 
exporting country, the U.S., are specified as:       
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 + 𝚪𝑙𝑛𝒁 + 𝚽𝑙𝑛𝑾𝑁 + 𝜖𝑒𝑒,                            (𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝑈𝑆 + 𝚪𝑙𝑛𝒁 + 𝚽𝑙𝑛𝑾𝑁 + 𝜖𝑒𝑒, (𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ)                
where 𝑃𝑒𝑒 and 𝑄𝑒𝑒 are the U.S. non-GM soybean export price and quantity to Japan, 
respectively, 𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝑈𝑆 is the U.S. GM soybean export price to Japan, 𝒁 is a vector of demand 
shifters of the Japanese market such as Japanese real income and a time trend, 𝑾𝑁 is a vector of 
the cost shifters for n competing non-GM soybean exporting countries including exchange rates 
between Japan and other non-GM soybean exporting countries such as Canada and China, and 
𝜖𝑒𝑒 is the error term.  The traditional approach ignores the interaction between two vertically 
differentiated goods, non-GM and GM soybeans, while the second case includes the interaction 
in the residual demand elasticity model of U.S. non-GM soybean exports to Japan.   
The parameters of interest in the RDE model are 𝛼1 and 𝛼2.  The 𝛼1 is the inverse of the 
residual demand elasticity of U.S. non-GM soybean exports to Japan.  When the estimate of 𝛼1 is 
zero, U.S. non-GM soybean exporters do not have market power in Japanese import markets.  In 
this situation, U.S. non-GM soybean exporters face a perfectly elastic demand curve so that they 
are price takers in the market.  On the other hand, when the estimate of 𝛼1 is negative and 
significant, U.S. non-GM soybean exporters have some market power in Japanese import 
markets (i.e., they can influence the soybean export price).  A larger absolute value of 𝛼�1 
indicates greater market power on the part of U.S. exporters.  The 𝛼2 is the coefficient of the GM 
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soybean price, and a statistically significant estimate of 𝛼2 implies that the model with the 
interaction between two vertically differentiated products (non-GM and GM soybeans) is 
preferred.  
 4.2.2 Empirical RSE Model 
I also specify two versions of the residual supply elasticity model for the importing 
country, Japan:  
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝚼𝑙𝑛𝑯 + 𝚿𝑙𝑛𝑹𝐿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖,                           (𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝐽𝑃 + 𝚼𝑙𝑛𝑯 + 𝚿𝑙𝑛𝑹𝐿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖, (𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ)               
where 𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑄𝑖𝑖 are the Japanese non-GM soybean import price and quantity from the U.S., 
𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝐽𝑃 is the Japanese GM soybean import price from the U.S., 𝑯 is a vector of supply shifters 
in the U.S. such as energy price, labor cost, soybean-corn price ratio futures prices, and a time 
trend, 𝑹𝐿 is a vector of the cost shifters for L competing non-GM soybean importing countries 
which includes the exchange rates between the U.S. and other non-GM soybean importing 
countries such as the EU, China, and South Korea, and 𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the error term.   
The parameters of interest in the RSE model are 𝛽1 and 𝛽2.  The 𝛽1 is the inverse of the 
residual supply elasticity faced by Japanese importers.  Japanese non-GM soybean importers do 
not have any market power and face a perfectly elastic supply curve when the estimate of 𝛽1 is 
zero.  Japanese importers have some market power when ?̂?1 is positive and significant, and their 
power is greater when the absolute value of ?̂?1 is larger.  If the parameter estimate (?̂?2) of the 
GM soybean price is statistically significant, the model with the interaction between two 
vertically differentiated products (non-GM and GM soybeans) is preferred. 
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 4.2.3 Empirical Partial Equilibrium Trade Model 
Two versions of the two-country partial equilibrium trade model are specified thus: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ �𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 + 𝚪𝑙𝑛𝒁 + 𝚽𝑙𝑛𝑾𝑁 + 𝜖𝑒𝑒 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝚼𝑙𝑛𝑯 + 𝚿𝑙𝑛𝑹𝐿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖               𝑎𝑛𝑑     
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ �𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝑈𝑆 + 𝚪𝑙𝑛𝒁 + 𝚽𝑙𝑛𝑾𝑁 + 𝜖𝑒𝑒 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝐽𝑃 + 𝚼𝑙𝑛𝑯 + 𝚿𝑙𝑛𝑹𝐿 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖.  
As noted above, the partial equilibrium trade model system is adapted to take possible 
contemporaneous cross-equation correlations into account.  There is an endogeneity problem 
because the quantity variables, 𝑄𝑒𝑒 and 𝑄𝑖𝑖, are both right-hand-side endogenous variables. 
Therefore, I use the 3SLS method for the estimation to address both the endogeneity issue and 
contemporaneous cross-equation correlations in the system.  
The parameters of interest are 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛽1, and 𝛽2.  The estimates of 𝛼1 and 𝛽1 indicate the 
existence and magnitude of U.S. exporters’ and Japanese importers’ market power in the 
corresponding market, respectively.  The estimates of 𝛼2 and 𝛽2 can show whether the 
interaction between two vertically differentiated products (non-GM and GM soybeans) should be 
included in the estimation of exporters’ and importers’ market power.  
  
46 
 
Figure 4.1: Residual Demand for Exporting Country 1’s Non-GM Soybeans in Importing 
Country 2’s Market. 
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47 
 
Figure 4.2: Residual Supply faced by Importing Country 2 in Exporting Country 1’s Non-
GM Soybean Market. 
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Chapter 5 - DATA DESCRIPTION 
 5.1 Trade Prices and Quantities 
Weekly data from January 2000 to December 2011 are used in the estimation.  I first 
discuss the export/import prices and quantities.  The weekly export price data for U.S. GM 
soybeans were obtained from Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and are shown in Figure 5.1.  The 
weekly price and quantity of Japanese non-GM soybean imports and the weekly price of 
Japanese GM soybean imports from the U.S. were obtained from Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE).  
Those data are illustrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.  
I need U.S. non-GM soybean prices for the estimation, but these data are not directly 
available.  Through contacting representatives of Cargill10 and Huron Commodities, Inc.11, I 
obtain the data of non-GM soybean premiums paid to U.S. farmers and know that the non-GM 
soybean premiums are greatly affected by the demand of non-GM soybeans.  Thus, I calculate 
U.S. non-GM soybean prices as the sum of U.S. GM soybean prices from CBOT and the (high-
protein) non-GM soybean premiums.  Since Japanese soybean wholesalers12 import non-GM 
soybeans to make food products such as tofu, miso, and natto (Japan Tofu Association13; Japan 
Natto Cooperative Society Federation14; Miso Online15), I use the high protein non-GM soybean 
premium price to calculate U.S. non-GM soybean prices. 
                                                 
10 Mr. Jeff Duckworth, Cargill, Bloomington, IL. http://www.cargillag.com.  
11 Mr. Jim Traub, Huron Commodities USA, Monticello, IL. http://www.huron.com/. 
12 Major soybean wholesalers are Marubeni Corporation http://www.marubeni.com/index.html, Mitsui & CO., LTD. 
http://www.mitsui.com/jp/en/index.html, and Sojitz Corporation http://www.sojitz.com/en/index.html. 
13 Japan Tofu Association is available at: http://www.tofu-as.jp/english/index.html. 
14 Japan Natto Cooperative Society Federation is available at: http://www.710.or.jp/ (in Japanese). 
15 Miso online is available at: http://www.miso.or.jp/en/index.html . 
49 
 
Because the GM soybean price from the CBOT is quoted in cents per bushel and the non-
GM soybean premiums are quoted in dollars per bushel, I use Metric Conversions (1 Metric Ton 
= 36.7437 bushels for soybeans) from the Ag Decision Maker at Iowa State University to convert 
the data from dollar per bushel to dollar per metric ton.  The calculated U.S. non-GM soybean 
prices are shown in Figure 5.1.   
I use real export and import prices in the estimation.  In an RDE model, I transform U.S. 
non-GM and GM soybean export prices to the real terms by using the consumer price index 
(CPI) in Japan.  Data on the monthly CPI in Japan were obtained from the portal site of Official 
Statistics of Japan, e-Stat.  In a RSE model, Japanese non-GM and GM soybean import prices 
are converted into real terms by using the producer price index (PPI) in the U.S.  The data on the 
monthly PPI in the U.S. were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Table 5.1 
shows the summary statistics of quantity, real prices for U.S. non-GM and GM soybean exports 
and Japanese non-GM and GM soybean imports, demand shifters, supply shifters, and cost 
shifters. 
 5.2 Demand, Supply, and Cost Shifters 
For the RDE model, I use the Japanese personal disposable income (PDI) as the 
destination market demand shifters.16  Data on the monthly PDI were obtained from the portal 
site of Official Statistics of Japan, e-Stat.  The PDI data are converted into real terms by using 
the CPI in Japan.  Weekly exchange rates between Japan and competing exporting countries 
including Canada and China were obtained from PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the 
University of British Columbia.  These exchange rates for the RDE model are expressed as the 
                                                 
16 Mulik and Crespi (2011) use destination countries’ wage index, wholesale price index, or producer price index 
(PPI) as the cost shifters in an RDE model for Indian and Pakistan Basmati rice exports analysis. 
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number of competing exporting countries’ currencies per Japanese yen.  For instance, the 
exchange rate between Japan and Canada on December 30, 2011, is 0.013157 Canadian dollars 
per Japanese yen.  
Cho et al. (2002) emphasized the importance of using real exchange rates, while most 
previous studies used nominal exchange rates in the estimation of RDE and RSE models.  In this 
study, I use real exchange rates, which are obtained by multiplying nominal exchange rates with 
the ratios of price levels in the two corresponding countries (Krugman and Obstfeld 2002).  The 
real exchange rate measures the purchasing power of a currency relative to another, which is 
known as purchasing power parity (PPP).  Following Krugman and Obstfeld (2002), a real 
exchange rate is calculated as: 
𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝑒1,2 𝑃1𝑃2, 
where 𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸 can be interpreted as the real exchange rate, 𝑒1,2 is the nominal exchange rate 
between country 1 and country 2, and 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are the price levels in countries 1 and 2, 
respectively.  Figures 5.5-5.9 show real exchange rates between Canada and Japan, China and 
Japan, the EU and the U.S., China and the U.S., and South Korea and the U.S. 
For the RSE model, I use the labor cost (LC) and the energy cost (EC) as the producers’ 
supply shifters.  Data on the monthly labor cost were obtained from the OECD iLibrary 
(http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org), and a monthly commodity fuel index was obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund as the energy cost.  The LC and EC data are converted to the real 
terms by using the PPI in the U.S.  I also use the soybean-corn price ratio (SCR) that is 
synthetically generated using soybean and corn futures prices.  The SCR is not a tradable futures 
contract and is being distributed for information purposes only (CME Group).  The November 
soybean futures over December corn futures is a key index for the present U.S. soybean farmers 
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to help them decide whether they will continue planting soybeans or shift to corn during the next 
year.  Data on the SCR (Figure 5.4) were obtained from CBOT.  After 2010, the SCR has been 
decreasing, and the SCR was below 2.0 in 2011.  Higher corn prices due to the increasing 
ethanol production have affected U.S. soybean production and supply functions in a cross or 
competitive commodity manner.  U.S. farmers have been willing to provide or produce fewer 
soybeans than corn in recent years because of the greater expected profitability for corn.  Thus, 
the soybean-corn price ratio is a factor in the crop decisions of U.S. farmers17.  Lin and Riley 
(1998) discussed whether the SCR is a reliable indicator for planting decisions.  They concluded 
that the SCR will provide a part of the explanation for farmers’ acreage choices between corn 
and soybeans.  The EU, China, and South Korea are other importing countries of U.S. non-GM 
soybeans.  Weekly exchange rates between the U.S. and the other destination countries including 
the EU, China, and South Korea were obtained from the PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the 
University of British Columbia.  These exchange rates in the RSE model are expressed as the 
number of other destination countries’ currency per U.S. dollar.  For instance, the exchange rate 
between the EU and the U.S. was 0.772201 euros per U.S. dollar on December 30, 2011. 
   
  
                                                 
17 This information is based on an interview with Dr. Daniel O’Brien, Extension Agricultural Economist-Northwest 
Research Extension Center, K-State Research and Extension. 
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Non-GM soybean Analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
𝑷 𝑼𝑺 (JPY/MT) 44723.64 40329.7 18231.49 202487.4 
𝑷𝑱𝑷 (USD/MT) 305.4874 72.00234 193.5037 534.8425 
𝑷𝑮𝑴,𝑼𝑺 (JPY/MT) 39053.34 34960.02 17062.81 177763.7 
𝑷𝑮𝑴,𝑱𝑷 (USD/MT) 268.2251 52.66697 179.6687 423.5965 
𝑸𝒏𝒐𝒏−𝑮𝑴 (MT) 17.07659 4.886468 5.851398 33.45151 
𝑬𝑹𝑱𝑷,𝑪𝑨 (CAD/JPY) 0.011653 0.001429 0.008209 0.014318 
𝑬𝑹𝑱𝑷,𝑪𝑯 (CHY/JPY) 0.072154 0.005594 0.061614 0.083787 
𝑬𝑹𝑼𝑺,𝑬𝑼 (EUR/USD) 0.847115 0.153871 0.629723 1.199544 
𝑬𝑹𝑼𝑺,𝑪𝑯 (CHY/USD) 7.681722 0.693274 6.310741 8.280202 
𝑬𝑹𝑼𝑺,𝑲𝑶 (KOW/USD) 1129.104 127.1173 906.38 1558.1 
𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑱𝑷 (JPY) 10390.1 434.0878 9560.059 11228.95 
𝑺𝑪𝑹𝑼𝑺  2.470471 0.377396 1.719088 3.978125 
𝑳𝑪𝑼𝑺  101.8193 4.644074 94.725 109.602 
𝑬𝑪𝑼𝑺  129.2759 26.7644 94.3 192.6 
𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅  313 180.5662 1 625 
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Figure 5.1: Non-GM and GM Soybean Prices in U.S. from January 2000 to December 2011 
 
Source: Chicago Board of Trade http://www.cmegroup.com/company/cbot.html, Cargill http://www.cargill.com/,  
             and Huron Commodities Inc. http://www.huron.com/about. 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Th
ou
sa
nd
s J
PY
/ 
M
T 
U.S. Non-GM Soybean Price U.S. GM Soybean Price
54 
 
Figure 5.2: Non-GM and GM Soybean Prices in Japan from January 2000 to December 
2011 
 
Source: Tokyo Grain Exchange http://www.tge.or.jp/english/index.shtml. 
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Figure 5.3: Non-GM Soybean Trading Volumes between U.S. and Japan from January 
2000 to December 2011 
 
Source: Tokyo Grain Exchange http://www.tge.or.jp/english/index.shtml.  
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Figure 5.4: The Soybean-Corn Price Ratio from January 2000 to December 2011 
 
Source: Chicago Board of Trade http://www.cmegroup.com/company/cbot.html.  
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Figure 5.5: Exchange Rate between Canada and Japan from January 2000 to December 
2011 
 
Source: PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the University of British Columbia http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html. 
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Figure 5.6: Exchange Rate between China and Japan from January 2000 to December 2011 
 
Source: PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the University of British Columbia http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html. 
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Figure 5.7: Exchange Rate between EU and the U.S. from January 2000 to December 2011 
 
Source: PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the University of British Columbia http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html. 
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Figure 5.8: Exchange Rate between China and the U.S. from January 2000 to December 
2011  
 
Source: PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the University of British Columbia http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html. 
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Figure 5.9: Exchange Rate between South Korea and the U.S. from January 2000 to 
December 2011 
 
Source: PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the University of British Columbia http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html. 
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Chapter 6 - ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 6.1 Econometric Issues 
 Endogeneity 
The quantity variables, 𝑄𝑒𝑒 and 𝑄𝑖𝑖, in the RDE and RSE model are both right-hand-
side endogenous variables.  Thus, there is an endogeneity problem in the estimation of both the 
RDE and the RSE model, and a traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method would lead to 
inconsistent coefficient estimates.  The 2SLS method can be used to solve this endogeneity 
problem.  Goldberg and Knetter (1999) indicated that “the natural instruments in this context are 
cost shifters for the exporting group of interest, since they are excluded from the estimating 
equation, but are correlated with quantity” (Goldberg and Knetter 1999, p.42).  
I follow Goldberg and Knetter’s method to conduct 2SLS estimation of the RDE and the 
RSE models.  For 𝑄𝑒𝑒 in the RDE model, the instruments I use are the supply shifters in the 
U.S., including energy price, labor cost, and soybean-corn price ratio futures prices and a time 
trend; the exchange rates between the U.S. and other importing countries such as the EU, China, 
and South Korea; and all exogenous variables in the corresponding case of the RDE model.  
Similarly, for 𝑄𝑖𝑖 in the RSE model, the instruments I use are the demand shifters of the 
Japanese market including Japanese real income and a time trend, the exchange rates between 
Japan and other non-GM soybean exporting countries such as Canada and China, and all 
exogenous variables in the corresponding case of the RSE model. 
In the two-country partial equilibrium trade model, I use the 3SLS method for the 
estimation to take care of both the endogeneity issue and contemporaneous cross-equation 
correlations in the system. 
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 Autocorrelation 
An autocorrelation problem is a violation of the assumption that the errors are 
uncorrelated.  I check the correlation between the current residual and the lagged residual 
obtained from the OLS estimation and test for the significance of coefficient 𝜌.  Table 6.1 shows 
the test results for autocorrelation.  Results indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected for all 
four models.  Therefore, I use an autoregressive model with AR(1) to correct the autocorrelation 
problems. 
Heteroskedasticity 
I use White’s test for heteroskedasticity (White 1980) to check for heteroskedasticity 
problems18 for each model.  The null hypothesis is: 
𝐻0:𝜎𝑖2 = 𝜎2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖. 
Table 6.2 includes the White’s test results for the RDE and RSE models.  Results show that the 
null hypothesis is rejected for all four models.  Thus, the heteroskedastic-consistent (White 
robust) standard errors should be used in hypothesis testing of parameters and constructing 
confidence intervals for all models.  The standard errors reported in all tables of estimation 
results are heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust).  
 6.2 Results for the Residual Demand Elasticity Model 
 The Traditional Approach  
I use the traditional approach to estimate the RDE model with OLS and 2SLS, and the 
results are reported in Table 6.3.  The adjusted 𝑀2s for two models were 0.97 and 0.96, 
                                                 
18 Other tests to detect heteroskedasticity are Breusch-Pagan tests and Goldfeld-Quandt tests. 
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respectively.19  The Hausman-Wu test results reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the 
quantity variable at the 1% significance level.  Thus, the 2SLS method is preferred. I focus on 
the results from the 2SLS estimation.  The Durbin-Watson statistic in the 2SLS is 2.17, and the 
heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust) standard errors are used and reported.  As in Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999), I initially included labor cost of the competitors and a time trend in the 
estimation, but these variables were eventually dropped from the model based on the significance 
levels of coefficient estimates and Akaike Information Criterion.  
 The coefficient estimate (-0.5638) of the quantity indicates that the U.S. non-GM 
soybean exporters’ market margin is 56.4% in the Japanese import market.  Table 7.6 provides 
the estimates of market margins in previous studies, which vary from as low as an insignificant 
number (statistically 0) to as high as 0.93.  A market margin of 56.4% is relatively large, and 
such a margin is probably consistent with the market situation, because the average market share 
of U.S. non-GM soybeans in the Japanese market was as high as 73% from 2000-2011.  On the 
other hand, this estimate may not be accurate because it is made through the traditional approach 
of the RDE model, which does not include the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans.  
Of interest also are the coefficients of the cost shifters of competing exporters (Canada 
and China) and the exchange rates between Japan and these two countries.  The two coefficient 
estimates are positive, and these are not of the expected sign.  A larger value of the exchange rate 
indicates a lower cost of the exporters in Canada or China, which should lead to a lower U.S. 
export price in terms of Japanese currency.     
The coefficient estimate of the demand shifter, the personal disposable income in Japan, 
has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that an increase 
                                                 
19 Wooldridge (2006) discusses the relationship between the R2 measures from OLS and 2SLS estimation.  
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in the PDI for Japan results in a higher U.S. non-GM soybean export price in the Japanese 
market.  This is consistent with the information that people of lower income consume more 
inexpensive, high-calorie foods and people of higher income consume more vegetables and 
soybeans in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2010). 
 The New Approach 
I also include the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans in the RDE model.  The 
new model is estimated using both OLS and 2SLS, and the results are reported in Table 6.3.  The 
adjusted 𝑀2s for two models are 0.96 and 0.94, respectively.  The Hausman-Wu test results reject 
the exogeneity of the quantity variable at the 1% level so that the 2SLS estimation is preferred.  
For the 2SLS estimation, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.19, and the heteroskedastic-consistent 
(White robust) standard errors are used and reported.  The labor cost of the competitors and a 
time trend were included in the estimation, but the variables were then dropped from the model 
based on the significance levels of coefficient estimates and Akaike Information Criterion.  
Now the coefficient estimate of the quantity is only -0.3286 and is statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  Thus, the U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market margin is 32.9% in the 
Japanese import market.  Therefore, the inclusion of the interaction between non-GM and GM 
soybeans has greatly reduced the estimate of U.S. exporters’ market margin from 56.4% to 
32.9%.  These results show that the RDE model without the inclusion of the interaction between 
non-GM and GM soybean overestimates U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market margin.  This 
result is consistent with that of Mulik and Crespi (2011) in which the Lerner index was lower 
after the entry of GM rice than that provided before the entry.   
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Another indicator is the coefficient estimate (0.7499) of the U.S. GM soybean price, 
which has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that the 
model with the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is preferred.  
The inclusion of the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans also helps alleviate 
the problem associated with the unexpected signs of the coefficient estimates of the cost shifters 
of competition exporters (Canada and China) and the exchange rates between these exporters and 
Japan.  Now one coefficient estimate, the exchange rate between Canada and Japan, has the 
expected negative sign, and the other coefficient estimate is still of the unexpected sign but is 
insignificant.   
The coefficient estimate on the personal disposable income in Japan still has the expected 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  The magnitude (2.0) in this case with the 
interaction is smaller than that (3.5) in the benchmark case.    
 6.3 Results for the Residual Supply Elasticity Model 
 The Traditional Approach  
The traditional approach is used to estimate the RSE model with OLS and 2SLS, and the 
results are reported in Table 6.4.  The adjusted 𝑀2s for two models were 0.99 and 0.96, 
respectively.  The Hausman-Wu test results reject the exogeneity of the quantity variable at the 
1% significance level.  Thus, the 2SLS method is preferred.  The Durbin-Watson statistic in the 
2SLS is 2.03 and the heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust) standard errors are used and 
reported.  I included labor cost of the import competitors and a time trend in the estimation, but 
those variables were eventually dropped based on the significance levels of coefficient estimates 
and Akaike Information Criterion. 
67 
 
The coefficient estimate of the quantity is 0.1914, and it is statistically significant.  This 
means that the Japanese non-GM soybean importers’ market margin is equal to the adjusted 
Lerner Index, 0.1914/(1+0.1914) = 16.1%, in the U.S. export market.  Although no previous 
study has analyzed Japanese importers’ mark-down, this estimate is probably comparable with 
other agricultural commodity trades shown in Table 6.6.  For instance, Portuguese dried salted 
cod importers had a 10.5% mark-down (Andersen et al. 2008), and Chinese soybean importers 
had a 13% mark-down (Song 2006).  On the other hand, this estimate may not be accurate, 
because it is from the traditional approach of the RSE model, which does not include the 
interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans.  
Of interest also are the coefficients of the cost shifters of competing importers (the EU, 
China, and South Korea) and the exchange rates between the U.S. and these three countries.  The 
coefficient estimates of the three exchange rates have the expected negative sign and are 
significant.  A larger value of the exchange rate indicates a higher cost of the importers in the 
competing importing countries, which should lead to fewer U.S. exports to those countries and a 
lower price of U.S exports in the Japanese market.  
The coefficient estimate of the supply shifter, the soybean-corn price ratio, has the 
expected positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that an increase in the 
SCR of future prices will lead to higher soybean import prices.  The coefficient estimate of the 
labor cost for the U.S. is insignificant, indicating that the labor cost for the U.S. had little 
influence on Japanese non-GM soybean import price.  
 The New Approach 
I add the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans into the RSE model and 
estimate the new model using both OLS and 2SLS.  The results are reported in Table 6.4.  The 
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adjusted 𝑀2s for two models are both 0.99.  The exogeneity of the quantity variable is rejected at 
the 1% level by the Hausman-Wu test, so the 2SLS estimation is preferred.  For the 2SLS 
estimation, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.14, and the heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust) 
standard errors are used and reported.  Labor cost of the importing competitors and a time trend 
were included in the estimation, but these variables were eventually dropped based on the 
significance levels of coefficient estimates and Akaike Information Criterion.  
The coefficient estimate of the quantity is 0.0627 and is statistically significant.  Thus, 
the Japanese non-GM soybean importers’ market margin is the adjusted Lerner Index, 
0.0627/(1+0.0627) = 5.9%, in the U.S. export market.  This means that the inclusion of the 
interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans has largely reduced the estimate of Japanese 
importers’ market margin from 16.1% to 5.9%.  These results show that the RSE model without 
the inclusion of the interaction between non-GM and GM soybean overestimates the Japanese 
non-GM soybean importers’ market margin.   
Another indicator is the coefficient estimate (0.9641) of the Japanese GM soybean price, 
which has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  This result shows that the 
model with the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is preferred.  
The coefficient estimate of the exchange rate between the U.S. and South Korea has the 
expected negative sign and is significant.  A higher exchange rate increases the importing cost of 
the importers in South Korea, which should result in fewer U.S. exports to South Korea and a 
lower price of U.S exports in the Japanese market.  The coefficient estimates of two other 
exchange rates are insignificant. 
The coefficient estimate on the soybean-corn price ratio still has the expected positive 
sign and is significant at the 1% level.  The magnitude (0.03) in this new approach is smaller 
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than that (0.32) in the traditional approach.  The coefficient estimate of the labor cost of the U.S. 
has the expected positive sign but is insignificant.  This result is the same as that from the 
traditional approach.  
 6.4 Results for the Two-Country Partial Equilibrium Trade Model 
Finally, I estimate the two-country partial equilibrium trade model for the traditional 
approach and the new approach including interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans.  The 
two-country partial equilibrium trade model includes both a RDE equation and a RSE equation.  
I estimate the two-country partial equilibrium trade model to account for possible 
contemporaneous correlation between the RDE equation and the RSE equation.  The 3SLS 
method is used to estimate this partial equilibrium trade model. 
The Traditional Approach 
The 3SLS results of the traditional version of the partial equilibrium trade model are 
reported in Table 6.5.  The adjusted 𝑀2s of the RDE and RSE equation are both 0.96.  The 
autocorrelation is corrected for each equation.  The heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust) 
standard errors are used and reported.  I included labor cost of the competitors and a time trend 
in the estimation, but I then dropped these variables based on the significance levels of 
coefficient estimates and Akaike Information Criterion. 
The signs, magnitudes, and significance levels of the parameter estimates of the partial 
equilibrium trade model are very close to the results of the traditional approach of the RDE 
model and the RSE model.  The coefficient estimates of the two quantity variables in the 3SLS 
estimation of the partial equilibrium trade model show that the U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ 
market margin is 56.5%, and the Japanese non-GM soybean importers’ market margin (adjusted 
Lerner Index) is equal to 0.192/(1+0.192) = 16.1%.  These results are mostly comparable to the 
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estimates of market margins in previous studies.  For example, although the data and 
independent variables differ from those of this study, Andersen et al. (2008) showed that 
Norwegian exporters had a market margin 1.7 times larger than that of Portuguese importers (see 
Table 6.6).  Yamaura (2011) showed that U.S. non-GM soybean exporters had a market margin 
five times larger than that of Japanese importers (see Table 6.6).  However, I need to keep in 
mind that these estimated market margins of the traditional approach may not be accurate, 
because the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is not taken into account.  
 The New Approach 
The 3SLS results of the partial equilibrium trade model with the interaction between non-
GM and GM soybeans are reported in Table 6.5.  The adjusted 𝑀2s of the RDE and RSE 
equation are 0.95 and 0.99, respectively.  I address the autocorrelation issue in both equations, 
and the heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust) standard errors are used and reported.  The 
labor cost of the competitors and a time trend were included in the estimation, but these variables 
were eventually dropped from the model based on the significance levels of coefficient estimates 
and Akaike Information Criterion. 
Estimation of both the RDE and RSE equations as systems in the partial equilibrium trade 
model improves the estimation of some coefficients.  The coefficient estimate (-0.2613) of the 
exchange rate between the U.S. and China has the expected negative sign and becomes 
statistically significant in the 3SLS estimation of the partial equilibrium trade model.  The 
coefficient estimate (0.0416) of another variable, the labor cost of the U.S., also becomes 
statistically significant in this new estimation of the system.  The coefficient estimates of other 
variables are similar to those in the new approach of the RDE and RSE models.  
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In the 3SLS estimation, the coefficient estimate (-0.3322) of the quantity variable in the 
RDE equation implies that the U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market margin is 33.2%.  Thus, 
the inclusion of the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans has greatly reduced the 
estimate of U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market margin from 56.5% to 33.2%.  In addition, 
the coefficient estimate (0.0641) of the quantity variable in the RSE equation shows that the 
Japanese non-GM soybean importers’ market margin (adjusted Lerner Index) is 
0.0641/(1+0.0641) = 6%.  Thus, the estimate of importers’ market margin has also been reduced 
from 16.1% to 6% when the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is included in the 
estimation.  
The coefficient estimate (0.7401) of the U.S. GM soybean price in the RDE equation has 
the expected positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  In the RSE equation, the coefficient 
estimate (0.9684) of the Japanese GM soybean price also has the expected positive sign and is 
significant at the 1% level.  Both results indicate that the model with the interaction between 
non-GM and GM soybeans is preferred. 
The Lerner indices, which represent the market margins for U.S. exporters and Japanese 
importers, calculated with the results of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, are included in Table 
6.7.  For comparing magnitudes of the Lerner indices for U.S. exporters and Japanese importers, 
the adjusted Lerner indices for Japanese importers are calculated from both the 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimations.  The Lerner index for U.S. exporters is a mark-up over the price.  Therefore, the 
U.S. exporters’ market margin is the difference between the price received and marginal cost.  
The adjusted Lerner index for Japanese importers is a mark-down over marginal value.  
Therefore, the Japanese importers’ market margin is the difference between marginal value (i.e., 
Japanese consumer’s price) and the price paid.  The Lerner indices for U.S. exporters and the 
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adjusted Lerner indices for Japanese importers by the 2SLS estimations are close to those 
produced by 3SLS estimations.  This is consistent with previous studies, such as the Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999) study20.  The Lerner indices for U.S. exporters are much greater than the 
adjusted Lerner indices for Japanese importers in all models by both methods, suggesting that the 
U.S. non-GM soybean exporters have much greater market margins than do Japanese non-GM 
soybean importers.  More importantly, the estimation results in the RDE, RSE, and partial 
equilibrium trade models show that, when the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is 
not taken into account, the market margins of both U.S. exporters and Japanese importers are 
greatly overestimated.  After taking the interaction into account, the new approach can 
significantly improve the accuracy of the estimates of those market margins of exporters and 
importers in international soybean markets.  Therefore, the inclusion of the interaction between 
non-GM and GM commodities in the empirical models is necessary and preferred.   
 
  
                                                 
20 Goldberg and Knetter (1999) used three methods: 2SLS, SUR, and 3SLS. 
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Table 6.1: Test Results for Autocorrelation 
 Coefficient Std. Error T-value Probability Result 
The Traditional Approach      
𝑀𝐷𝑀 0.9278 0.0149 62.29 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
𝑀𝑆𝑀 0.9484 0.0124 76.43 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
The New Approach      
𝑀𝐷𝑀 0.7829 0.0250 31.32 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
𝑀𝑆𝑀 0.9527 0.0111 85.57 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
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 Table 6.2: White’s Test Results for Heteroskedasticity 
 White’s Test Statistics Probability  Result 
The Traditional Approach    
𝑀𝐷𝑀 202.41 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
𝑀𝑆𝑀 240.57 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
The New Approach    
𝑀𝐷𝑀 192.85 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
𝑀𝑆𝑀 206.27 0.000 𝑹𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝑯𝟎 
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Table 6.3: Estimation Results of the RDE Models  
Dependent Variables: Price of U.S. Non-GM Soybean exports (in Japanese Yen) 
 The Traditional Approach The New Approach 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 26.8567** 3.8460*** 23.6141*** 5.4606*** 
 (12.2064) (0.9458) (6.2565) (1.3643) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 -0.0200* -0.5638*** -0.0104** -0.3286*** 
 (0.0116) (0.1960) (0.0088) (0.1239) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝑈𝑆   0.7855*** 0.7499*** 
   (0.0737) (0.0779) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝐽𝑃,𝐶𝐴 -0.2908 0.4916* 0.0495 -0.0084 
 (0.3501) (0.2829) (0.1596) (0.1237) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝐽𝑃,𝐶𝐻 0.9279*** 1.0406*** 0.2037 0.1738 
 (0.3458) (0.3096) (0.1770) (0.1537) 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐽𝑃 1.5357* 3.5168*** 1.6544*** 2.0009*** 
 (0.9178) (0.9535) (0.4451) (0.4999) 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀2 0.9706 0.9598 0.9636 0.9427 
𝐷𝑊 2.2339 2.1762 2.1183 2.1918 
𝐻𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛 −𝑊𝑢  9.78***  16.03*** 
*, **, and *** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The values in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. 
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Table 6.4: Estimation Results of the RSE Models 
Dependent Variables: Price of Japanese Non-GM Soybean Imports (in U.S. Dollar)   
 The Traditional Approach The New Approach 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 22.6517*** 0.4530*** -0.3506 -0.0012 
 (2.0187) (0.0405) (0.6524) (0.0014) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖 0.0066*** 0.1914* 0.0007*** 0.0627* 
 (0.0024) (0.0979) (0.0001) (0.0354) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝐽𝑃   0.9641*** 0.9687*** 
   (0.0238) (0.0240) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆,𝐸𝑈 -0.0221 -0.0290** 0.0044 0.0201 
 (0.2971) (0.0032) (0.0241) (0.0267) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆,𝐶𝐻 -4.6931*** -4.6063*** 0.1757 0.3195 
 (0.9711) (0.9580) (0.2109) (0.2247) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆,𝐾𝑂 -0.5055*** -0.4663*** -0.0685*** -0.0877*** 
 (0.1954) (0.1903) (0.0237) (0.0258) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆 0.3151*** 0.3209*** 0.0322*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0735) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑀𝑈𝑆 0.1538 -0.0105 0.0085 0.0394 
 (0.1163) (0.1434) (0.0105) (0.0307) 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀2 0.9882 0.9598 0.9952 0.9945 
𝐷𝑊 2.0323 2.0283 2.1338 2.1419 
𝐻𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛 −𝑊𝑢  12.17***  23.48*** 
*, **, and *** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The values in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors.  
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Table 6.5: Estimation Results (3SLS) of the U.S.-Japan Partial Equilibrium Trade Models 
 The Traditional Approach The New Approach 
 RDE eq. RSE eq. RDE eq. RSE eq. 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 3.8542*** 0.4534*** 5.6076*** -0.0011 
 (0.8083) (0.0600) (0.9004) (0.0007) 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 -0.5651***  -0.3322***  
 (0.1612)  (0.0863)  
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝑈𝑆   0.7401***  
   (0.0406)  
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝐽𝑃,𝐶𝐴 0.4915***  -0.0149  
 (0.1747)  (0.0922)  
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝐽𝑃,𝐶𝐻 1.0370***  0.1818  
 (0.2541)  (0.1441)  
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝐽𝑃 3.5260***  2.0563***  
 (0.8499)  (0.3546)  
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖  0.1920**  0.0641*** 
  (0.0917)  (0.0111) 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝑀,𝐽𝑃    0.9684*** 
    (0.0030) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆,𝐸𝑈  0.0276  0.0193 
  (0.2417)  (0.0183) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆,𝐶𝐻  -4.6235***  -0.2613* 
  (1.0935)  (0.1402) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆,𝐾𝑂  -0.4640**  -0.0919*** 
  (0.2177)  (0.0165) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑆  0.3214***  0.0298*** 
  (0.0681)  (0.0051) 
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑀𝑈𝑆  -0.0112  0.0416** 
  (0.2436)  (0.0172)  𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀2 0.9598 0.9601 0.9464 0.9946 
𝐷𝑊 2.1867  2.1991  
*, **, and *** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The values in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors.
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Table 6.6: Estimates of Inverse of Residual Demand Elasticity and Residual Supply Elasticity for Agricultural Commodities 
Authors Agricultural 
Commodity 
Source Country Destination Country Coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑒𝑒 
(Inverse of Residual Demand 
Elasticity) 
Coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑖 
(Inverse of Residual Supply 
Elasticity) 
Methods Number of 
Observations 
Carter et al. (1999)a Wheat U.S. 
Canada 
Australia 
Japan       -0.93*** 
-0.49 
-0.08 
 2SLS 86 
88 
85 
Yang and Lee (2001) Wheat 
 
 
Corn 
U.S. 
Canada 
Australia 
U.S. 
China 
South Korea     -0.384** 
      -0.146*** 
    -0.142** 
-0.054 
-0.032 
 SUR 27 
Cho et al. (2002) Wheat U.S. Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippine 
Singapore 
-0.004 
-0.112 
      -0.614*** 
      -0.121*** 
      -0.838*** 
      -0.160*** 
 SUR 22 
Saghaian and Reed 
(2004) 
Beef 
(Ribs) 
Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
U.S. 
Japan     -0.117** 
    -0.171** 
      -0.187*** 
      -0.322*** 
 SUR 94 
Poosiripinyo and 
Reed (2005)b 
Chicken Brazil 
China 
Thailand 
U.S. 
Japan       -0.253*** 
-0.108 
-0.081 
      -0.229*** 
 GLS 180 
Song (2006) Soybean U.S. China       -0.04***     0.13*** 3SLS 74 
Andersen et al. (2008) Dried salted Cod Norway Portugal        -0.173***      0.105*** 3SLS 156 
Felt et al. (2010) Pork 
1st Subperiod 
 
Denmark 
Canada 
U.S. 
Japan   -0.02* 
  -0.05* 
 0.01 
 GMM 148 
 2nd Subperiod Denmark 
Canada 
U.S. 
Japan -0.01 
  -0.04* 
  -0.10* 
   
Mulik and Crespi 
(2011) 
Basmati Rice 
1st Period 
 
India 
 
 
U.S. 
U.K. 
Kuwait 
1.2% 
27.33% 
13.84% 
 3SLS 74 
 2nd Period 
 
 
India U.S. 
U.K. 
Kuwait 
  2.31% 
19.12% 
  5.69% 
   
Yamaura (2011) Non-GM Soybean U.S. Japan   -0.22* 0.04* 3SLS 60 
a: Carter et al. (1999) have different observations in each model. 
b: In Poosiripinyo and Reed (2005), residual demand elasticities of Brazilian and Chinese chicken are for whole birds, and those of Thai and U.S. chicken are for cuts of other  
    types. 
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Table 6.7: Estimates of Lerner Indices (Market Margins) for U.S. Exporters and Japanese 
Importers 
 2SLS   3SLS 
The Benchmark Case   
U.S. Exporters’ Lerner Index 56.38% 56.51% 
Japanese Importers’ Adjusted Lerner 
Index 
16.07% 16.11% 
The Case with Interaction   
U.S. Exporters’ Lerner Index 32.86% 33.22% 
Japanese Importers’ Adjusted Lerner 
Index 
5.90%  6.02% 
Note: The Lerner index for Japanese importers is the inverse of residual supply elasticity:  𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑄
𝑃
∗ 𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑄
=  1
𝜀𝑠
.  
The adjusted Lerner index for Japanese importers is the inverse of one plus residual supply elasticity:  
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑄𝑃∗𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑄1+𝑄𝑃∗𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑄 = 11+𝜀𝑠. 
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Chapter 7 - CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, theoretical RDE, RSE, and two-country partial equilibrium trade 
models are developed, and the corresponding empirical models are specified for U.S.-Japan 
soybean trade.  I compare two versions of these models: a new approach in which the interaction 
between non-GM and GM soybeans is taken into account and the traditional approach in which 
the interaction is ignored.  
In each of the three models (the RDE model, the RSE model, and the partial equilibrium 
trade model), the traditional approach overestimates the market margin of U.S. non-GM soybean 
exporters and that of Japanese non-GM soybean importers.  By taking into account the 
interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans, the new approach significantly reduces the 
estimates of the corresponding market margins of U.S. exporters and Japanese importers to 
improve the accuracy of such estimates.  The high statistical significance of the coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term, the U.S. GM soybean price or the Japanese GM soybean price, 
in all three models also suggests that the new approach, which includes the interaction between 
non-GM and GM soybeans, is necessary and preferred.   
The partial equilibrium trade model includes both an RDE equation and an RSE equation 
in a system to address the possible contemporaneous cross-equation correlation.  Thus, the 
estimation results of the partial equilibrium trade model are further improved, compared to those 
of the RDE model and the RSE model.  Using the traditional approach to estimate the partial 
equilibrium trade model, I find that the U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market margin is 56.5% 
and the Japanese non-GM soybean importers’ market margin is 16.1%.  However, the results 
from using the new approach show that the market margins of U.S. exporters and Japanese 
importers are 33.2% and 6%, respectively.  By taking the interaction between non-GM and GM 
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soybeans into account, the new approach improves the accuracy of the estimates of market 
margins of soybean exporters and importers.  U.S. non-GM soybean exporters do have a 
significant market margin in international markets, but it is not as large as the one suggested by 
the traditional approach.  Although Japanese non-GM soybean importers enjoy some market 
margin, it is relatively small.   
The theoretical and empirical models and results in this dissertation can be useful for 
industry participants in international soybean markets, academic researchers, and government 
policy makers.  Japan is an important importer of world soybean trade.  Japan imports non-GM 
soybeans to make soybean food products in Japan such as tofu or natto, which are the main food 
choices for Japanese consumers.  Since U.S. non-GM soybeans account for over 70% in the 
Japanese import market and over 65% in Japanese non-GM soybean consumption21, the 
Japanese soybean consumption has heavily depended on U.S. non-GM soybeans.  Additionally, 
the U.S. GM soybean cultivation acreage has increased in the past 15 years, and over 90% of 
soybean acreage was dedicated to GM soybeans in 2011.  With the decreasing non-GM soybean 
production in the U.S., Japanese non-GM soybean importers have to pay higher premiums for 
U.S. non-GM soybeans.  Given the significant share of U.S. soybeans in the Japanese soybean 
import market, it is usually believed that U.S. non-GM soybean exporters could influence the 
market price while Japanese non-GM soybean importers were just price takers.  However, my 
results indicate that, although U.S. non-GM soybean exporters have some market power, it is not 
as great as that suggested through the traditional approach.  It is also shown that Japanese non-
                                                 
21 Japanese non-GM soybean consumption includes Japanese domestic soybeans and imports. Japanese domestic 
soybean productions are all non-GM. 
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GM soybean importers can still influence import price, albeit to a smaller extent.  All of these 
results and information should prove useful for industry participants in related markets.  
Since the beginning of this century, other large agricultural exporting countries such as 
Brazil and Argentina have been increasingly stronger competitors to the U.S. in international 
markets of agricultural commodities (Yang and Lee 2001; Poosiripinyo and Reed 2005; Song 
2006; Felt et al. 2010).  Better policies based on new and improved research are needed to assist 
agricultural producers and exporters in the U.S.  My new estimation results for international 
soybean markets can prove helpful not only to U.S. policy makers but also to other large 
agricultural exporting country policy makers.  Also, new estimation results are useful for 
Japanese and other policy makers in large agricultural importing countries (i.e., the EU, China, 
South Korea, or Mexico).  The empirical models and estimation results can also provide some 
references for academic researchers analyzing competition issues for differentiated products in 
international markets of agricultural commodities. 
Three possible extensions of this research are empirical studies on the market margins of 
exporters and importers in other major soybean exporting and importing countries, empirical 
studies on international markets of other agricultural commodities, and studies on international 
markets with horizontal or mixed product differentiation.  When non-GM and GM soybean data 
from other large soybean-producing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and China and the data 
from other large soybean-importing countries such as EU, China, and South Korea are available, 
empirical studies using the new approach on the market margins of exporters and importers of 
those countries can provide much needed and useful results.  Similar studies on international 
markets of other non-GM and GM commodities such as corn, cotton, and canola can also offer 
practical insights.  This dissertation includes a new approach based on capturing the interaction 
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between two vertically differentiated products (non-GM and GM soybeans).  Future research on 
the interaction of products with other types of product differentiation such as horizontal or mixed 
product differentiation could be useful for international markets of products with those special 
characteristics.    
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